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I n	the	philosophy	of	perception,	a	venerable	tradition	transfixes	on	perceptual relativities,	the	fact	that	in	some	sense	the	ways	things	appear	to	us	in	perception	change	as	a	number	of	perceptual	vari-
ables	—	illumination,	 object	 orientation	—	are	 altered.	 That	 tradition	
has	used	this	fact	for	many	purposes:	to	argue	for	the	epistemic	the-
sis	that	we	do	not	directly	perceive	an	objective	or	mind-independent	
world,	for	the	metaphysical	thesis	that	properties	such	as	colours	are	
relative	 to	perceptual	circumstance	or	even	mental,	and	so	on.	One	
way	to	claw	back	from	these	worries	is	to	focus	not	on	the	ways	per-
ceived	things	vary	across	perceptual	circumstances,	but	instead	on	the	
way	they	don’t,	to	focus	on	perceptual constancies.1	Stated	loosely,	the	lat-
ter	includes	for	example	the	respect	in	which	experienced	colours	and	
shapes	are	relatively	stable	throughout	our	daily	lives,	despite	contin-
ual	variations	in	illumination	conditions,	the	relative	orientation	and	
distances	of	objects,	and	so	on.	In	fact	some	take	constancies	to	be	a	
core	justification	for	direct	realism	and	of	an	objectivist	approach	to	
the	metaphysics	of	perceived	properties.2
A	dialectical	gulf	emerges	if	individuals	on	one	side	(e. g.,	persons	
focused	on	perceptual	relativities)	yield	to	the	temptation	to	explain	
away	the	opposing	phenomenon	(e. g.,	perceptual	constancies).3	More	
modestly,	 those	 entranced	 by	 perceptual	 relativities	 may	 seek	 to	
1.	 Another,	 perhaps	more	 familiar,	way	 is	 to	 account	 for	 these	 relativities	 in	
ways	that	do	not	conflict	with	direct	realism	or	colour	objectivism.	I	take	one	
or	both	of	 these	possibilities	 to	provide	motivation	 for	adverbialism,	repre-
sentationalist	approaches	to	perception,	and	so	on.
2.	 For	example,	perceptual	constancies	are	central	to	Smith’s	(2002)	argument	
for	direct	realism,	and	Bradley	and	Tye	argue	that	the	“fact	that	objects	ap-
pear	to	retain	the	same	colour	through	a	wide	variety	of	changes	in	the	il-
lumination	conditions	 (though	certainly	not	all)	 strongly	 suggests	 that	 co-
lours	are	illumination-independent	properties	of	those	objects”	(2001,	480).	
Hilbert	(1992)	and	Byrne	&	Hilbert	(2003)	offer	colour	constancy	as	one	of	
the	core	motives	for	their	view.	See	also	Tye	(2000).	Similar	arguments	can	
be	made	by	appeal	to	perceptions	involving	shape	constancy,	size	constancy,	
and	so	on.
3.	 Russell	responds	to	Dawes	Hicks’s	(1912)	tacit	appeal	to	colour	constancy	by	
asserting	 that	 “A	 colour	which	presents	 a	 different	 aspect	 is	 a	 different	 co-
lour,	and	there	is	an	end	of	the	matter”	(1913,	79).	Russell	seems	unwilling	to	
consider	the	possibility	that	a	colour	can	be	constant	despite	the	presence	of	
perceptual	relativities	concerning	it.	See	below	for	more	detail.
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precisely	 that.	 In	such	a	case	one	experiences	both	a	variable	and	a	
constant	 colour	 along	 the	 same	 line	 of	 sight,	 thus	meeting	 the	 VC	
Challenge	in	a	direct	way.
We	proceed	as	follows:
§1 A brief history of colour constancy and a contextual motive for 
the layering account are offered.
§2 Theoretical constraints that seek to avoid the dialectical gulf 
mentioned above are identified.
§3 An analysis of the concept perspective on a colour that can un-
derwrite colour constancy is offered.
§4 The analysis from §3 is applied to colour constancy and the 
layering account is developed.
§5 The proposed account is contrasted with two alternative views.
§6 The discussion is summarized.
Some	qualifications	will	be	helpful.
The	core	sense	of	“transparent”	relevant	to	the	Layering	Thesis	is	
that	 in	which	 transparent	 things	 are	 things	 that	we	 can	 see through.	
This	 is	often	supplemented	with	a	more	physical	or	reductive	mean-
ing	in	which	things	are	transparent	to	the	extent	that	they	transmit	(as	
opposed	to	absorb	or	reflect)	light	that	strikes	them.	The	latter	is	cru-
cial	to	optics	and	various	discussions	in	colour	perception.	My	focus	
will	be	on	colour	experience	and	as	such	the	 former	 is	most	relevant.	
To	 see	why,	 consider	 for	 example	describing	 experience	 representa-
tionally.	Here,	to	experience	something	as	transparent	is	most	funda-
mentally	to	be	in	a	visual	state	that	represents	that	thing	as	something	
through	which	one	can	see.	In	doing	so	one	need	not	visually	repre-
sent	the	thing	as	something	having	such-and-such	light	transmission	
explain	 constancies	 indirectly,	 for	 example	 by	 appeal	 to	mental	 dis-
positions	to	make	judgements,	instead	of	directly	by	appeal	to	aspects	
of	what	is	presently	perceived.	Within	our	focus	of	colour	theory	we	
see	 this	 in	Cohen’s	 (2008)	 attempt	 to	 explain	 colour	 constancies	 in	
terms	 of	 the	mind’s	 disposition	 to	make	 counterfactual	 judgements	
about	 colour	appearances.	The	converse	can	be	 found	 in	colour	ob-
jectivists	like	Byrne	and	Hilbert	[B&H]	(1997a,	2003;	see	also	Hilbert	
2005),	who	assert	that	colour	relativities	can	be	broadly	(if	not	wholly)	
explained	by	 the	mind’s	disposition	 to	misrepresent	actual	 constant	
colours.	For	neither	is	the	opposing	phenomenon	—	constancy	for	Co-
hen,	 relativity	 for	B&H	—	indicative	of	 correctly	perceived	occurrent	
features;	it	is	instead	indicative	of	our	perceptually	representing	some-
thing	other	than	what	is	currently	perceived.	
I	 believe	 that	 our	 theoretical	 commitments	 have	 been	 exerting	
more	influence	than	they	have	earned,	that	the	phenomena	of	colour	
constancy	and	the	relativities	therein	demand	an	approach	that	gives	
both	equal	footing.	A	core	philosophical	challenge,	and	the	challenge	
that	guides	this	work,	is	to	articulate	the	respect	in	which	both	variable	
and	constant	elements	of	 these	perceptual	scenarios	are	present and	
integrated in	perceptual	experience.4	For	ease	of	reference	I	will	call	this	
the	Variable-Constant Challenge or	simply	the	VC Challenge.	My	answer	
is	drawn	from	the	following	thesis:
Colour Layering Thesis:	 we	 can	 experience	 two	 colours	
along	a	single	line	of	sight,	one	(opaque)	colour	through	
the	other	(transparent)	colour.
Applied	to	colour	constancy,	the	idea	is	that	one	of	these	colours	re-
mains	constant,	while	the	other	varies,	and	we	are	able	to	experience	
4.	 A	 corollary	 to	 this	 challenge	 is	 the	 challenge	of	determining	 the	extent	 to	
which	each	of	these	elements	are	mind-dependent.	While	I	feel	many	strong	
pulls	toward	colour	subjectivism,	I	believe	that	an	accurate	analysis	of	colour	
constancies	and	its	relativities	can	remain	neutral	on	this	issue	—	see	below.	
Note	that	by	treating	colour	experience	as	central	I	am	setting	to	the	side	ap-
proaches	to	colour	theory	that	do	not	make	this	commitment.
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reconstruction	 in	§1	 (and	continued	references	 throughout)	with	an	
eye	 on	 illuminating	 influential	 philosophical	 accounts	 of	 constancy,	
the	importance	of	the	VC	Challenge,	and	my	proposed	solution.	
§1 A partial and evaluative history of colour constancy
At	first	pass,	colour	constancy	occurs	when	one	seemingly	perceives	
a	constant	colour	despite	 the	presence	of	some	“variability”	 in	one’s	
perception	of	that	colour.	Common	examples	include	perceiving	the	
colour	 of	 a	 hat	 both	 indoors	 and	outdoors,	 both	 in	 daylight	 and	 in	
twilight,	 both	with	 and	without	 sunglasses,	 et	 cetera.	During	many	
changes	of	these	sorts	there	is	a	sense	in	which	one	perceives	the	co-
lour	of	the	hat	to	be	constant,	while	some	aspect	of	one’s	colour	per-
ception	changes.	These	are	successful	 instances	of	colour	constancy.	
By	contrast,	during	the	changes	in	which	(by	hypothesis)	one	in	some	
robust	sense	fails	to	perceive	the	hat’s	colour	to	be	constant	we	have	
constancy	failure.	I	will	characterize	the	phenomenon	more	precisely	
below.	My	present	purpose	 is	 stage-setting,	 to	 summarize	points	of	
recent	philosophical	interest	and	their	drawbacks.
Consider	the	definition	of	colour	constancy	given	by	B&H	in	their	
influential	 Readings in Colour:	 “Stability	 of	 the	 perceived	 color	 of	 a	
surface	across	 changes	 in	 illumination	and	 the	 consequent	 changes	
in	the	light	reaching	the	eye”	(1997c,	445;	they	acknowledge	that	the	
definition	is	not	settled	on	p.	456).	According	to	this	definition	what	
is	variable	in	constancy	scenarios	is	illumination,	and	although	such	
variabilities	“reach	the	eye”	there	is	no	commitment	as	to	whether	or	
not	they	are	experienced.	This	is	reflective	of	broad	assumptions	then	
present	 in	 scientific	 research	 on	 colour	 constancy,	 and	 it	 is	 doubly	
problematic.	Let	me	explain.
§1.1 From computationalism to reflectance physicalism. 
In	much	psychological	and	philosophical	literature	colour	constancy	is	
discussed	by	reference	to	variabilities	in	illumination.	One	motivation	
for	doing	so	 is	because	many	examples	of	colour	constancy	 involve	
seeing	a	thing’s	colour	to	be	the	same	both	when	viewed	indoors	and	
properties,	even	though	by	hypothesis	it	in	fact	has	those	properties	
and	its	transparency	is	physically	realized	by	them.5
In	what	 follows	 I	presume	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 the	kinds	of	everyday	
colour	experiences	on	which	we	will	be	focused,	colour	experience	is	
both	intentional	and	phenomenal:	it	involves	experiencing	a	phenom-
enal	colour	(e. g.,	a	bluish	quality)	on	objects,	where	those	objects	are	
typically	taken	(correctly	or	not)	to	be	in	the	world	outside	ourselves.6
With	respect	to	colour	relativities	I	am	interested	in	those	that	are	
inherently	present	during	 colour	 constancy	perceptions	 (e. g.,	 illumi-
nation	variations,	filter	variations	such	as	 the	presence	and	absence	
of	sunglasses,	etc.).	There	is	much	to	be	gained	in	this	context	from	
focusing	on	factors	that	are	exoskeletal.	Additional,	more	subjective	
relativities	—	the	 possibility	 of	 spectrum	 inversion,	 intersubjective	
variabilities	 in	unique	hue	perceptions,	 and	 so	on	—	are	a	key	piece	
of	the	puzzle	that	is	colour,	but	affect	our	theorizing	in	different	ways	
than	are	my	focus.
Several	 issues	 regarding	 colour	 constancy	will	 not	 be	 addressed.	
One	 of	 these	 is	 a	 distinct	 problem	 of	 perceptual	 ambiguity.	 For	 ex-
ample	I	might	experience	the	same	stimulus	at	once	as	a	differently	
illuminated	but	similarly	painted	wall	and	then	as	a	differently	painted	
but	similarly	illuminated	wall.	A	full	theory	of	colour	constancy	must	
give	 a	 satisfactory	 treatment	 of	 such	 ambiguities	—	I	 will	 not	 do	 so	
here.	Another	is	the	disunity	in	psychological	accounts	of	colour	con-
stancy	(see,	e. g.,	Chirimuuta	2008).	If	psychologists	are	not	in	agree-
ment	about	how	to	characterize	and	interpret	colour	constancy,	then	
the	 impact	of	 their	data	(and	theories)	on	philosophical	accounts	of	
the	phenomenon	cannot	be	 straightforward.	 I	 cannot	work	 through	
such	 issues	 in	 this	 work.	 Instead,	 I	 will	 offer	 a	 brief	 and	 selective	
5.	 These	two	senses	of	“transparent”	are	reasonably	analogous	to	characterizing	
“water”	in	terms	of	its	perceived	properties	(colourless,	etc.)	and	its	underlying	
physical	structure	(H
2
O).	See,	e. g.,	Westphal	(1986),	Gilbert	(1987),	and	Har-
din	(1989)	for	a	discussion	of	these	and	related	issues	with	regard	to	colour.
6.	 Note	that	“intentional”	 in	this	sense	 is	 intended	to	be	consistent	both	with	
representational	 and	 acquaintance-based	 approaches	 to	 perception.	 See	
below.
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This	fits	nicely	with	a	familiar	approach	to	colour	ontology:	if	what	
the	colour	vision	system	is	trying	to	do	and	often	succeeds	in	doing	
is	 track(ing)	 reflectances	 in	 the	 environment	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 inci-
dent	illuminations,	then,	since	what	it	is	tracking	must	by definition be	
colours,	colours	are	 illumination-independent	and	intimately	tied	to	
reflectances.9	Thus,	 to	some,	Reflectance	Physicalism	emerges	as	an	
eminently	appealing	orientation	to	colour	ontology:	it	not	only	recov-
ers	our	common	sense	belief	that	things	in	the	world	have	colours	and	
have	them	independently	of	how	we	are,	it	also	fits	nicely	into	a	robust	
contemporary	 research	programme	 in	 vision	 science.	 The	 approach	
faces	many	difficulties10,	but	these	virtues	contribute	to	a	theoretical	
“hard	core”	its	adherents	feel	is	worth	defending.
how	illumination	varies	in	a	scene	and	how	that	connects	to	invariant	reflec-
tance	profiles.	
	 	 I	will	emphasize	the	computational	approach.	This	is	primarily	because	of	
the	influence	the	computational	approach	has	had	on	philosophical	theory,	
but	also	in	part	because	there	is	no	generally	accepted	model	for	adaptation	
in	vision	research.	Perhaps	the	most	popular	one,	von	Kries	adaptation,	has	
fared	poorly	under	scrutiny.	In	fact	“[e]ach	of	the	postulates	of	von	Kries’	ad-
aptation	have	been	subjected	to	sharply	focused	empirical	test,	and	it	is	clear	
that	each	fails”	(Brainard,	2004,	956).
9.	 Hilbert	(1992)	expresses	sympathy	with	this	particular	line	of	reasoning.	Per-
haps	colours	are	themselves	reflectances,	or	are	classes	of	reflectances	(e. g.,	
Byrne	&	Hilbert,	2003,	defend	the	latter).	Regardless,	there	is	no	doubt	that	
colour	constancy	and	in	particular	something	akin	to	the	computational	ap-
proach	has	been	influential.	For	example	see	the	quote	and	references	in	note	
2.	I	generally	resist	giving	much	weight	to	the	claim	that	colours	have	to	be	
(or	plausibly	are)	what	colour	vision	systems	track	in	the	world.	It	is	just	as	
possible	 (and	plausible)	 that	 such	 systems	 evolved	 to	 give	 their	 owners	 a	
more	 efficient	 class	 of	 properties	—	colours	—	with	which	 to	 cognize	 about	
the	world	than	the	world	itself	contains.	On	such	a	view	what	such	systems	
track	 in	 the	world	 is	 (e. g.)	 reflectance	 information	but	what	 they	construct	
and	what	gets	used	by	the	mind	in	which	these	systems	are	embedded	are	co-
lours.	See,	e. g.,	Hardin	(1992).	For	my	part	both	what	is	internally	constructed	
and	what	external	elements	such	systems	track	equally	deserve	the	label	“co-
lours”,	but	these	considerations	fall	outside	our	present	discussion.
10.	 Some	well-known	 challenges	 to	 Reflectance	 Physicalism	 concern	 its	 treat-
ment	of	metamers,	normal	 intersubjective	variations	 in	colour	perceptions,	
colour	opponency,	etc.	Hardin	(1988)	is	an	obvious	source.
then	outdoors,	in	direct	light	and	in	shadow,	and	so	on.	Another,	less	
innocent,	motivation	is	perhaps	because	this	focus	suggests	a	simple	
orientation	to	the	theory	of	colour	constancy:	what	is	variable	is	the	
nature	of	the	incident	(i. e.,	pre-reflected)	light	and	what	is	constant	
is	the	object’s	or	surface’s	propensity	to	reflect	 light	(i. e.,	 its	surface	
spectral	 reflectance	 profile,	 or	 SSR).	 This	 affords	 a	 straightforward	
empirical	research	programme	for	studying	colour	constancy.7	What	
the	eye	receives	from	the	world	(i. e.,	 the	colour	signal)	 is	 light	that	
has	 been	 reflected	 from	 the	 object	 seen.	 The	nature	 of	 that	 reflect-
ed	light	is	a	function	of	both the	nature	of	the	incident	light	and	the	
nature	of	the	object’s	SSR.	The	computational	task	facing	the	vision	
system	is	to	factor	out	these	two	contributions	to	the	reflected	light	
and	track	the	latter.	When	and	to	the	extent	that	it	is	successful,	one	
perceives	a	constant	colour	despite	 the	presence	of	an	 illumination	
variation;	when	and	to	the	extent	that	it	is	not,	one	has	no	such	per-
ception.	Thus	emerges	what	I	regard	as	the	traditional	computational	
approach	to	colour	constancy,	and	the	quest	for	understanding	how	
and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 vision	 system	 accomplishes	 this	 factoring-
then-reflectance-tracking	task.8
7.	 Here	are	some	examples:	Land	&	McCann	(1971),	Land	(1986),	Brainard	&	
Wandell	(1988),	Wandell	(1989),	Brainard,	Brunt	&	Speigle	(1997).	Shevell	&	
Kingdom	(2008)	is	a	worthwhile	recent	review	of	the	wider	literature.	Other	
contributions	will	be	referenced	when	appropriate.
8.	 Psychologists	 sometimes	 distinguish	 between	 mechanistic	 and	 computa-
tional	 approaches	 to	 colour	 constancy.	 The	 former	 focuses	 on	 the	mecha-
nisms	of	the	vision	system	that	are	facilitating	colour	constancy	(and	is	thus	
largely	neurophysiological)	and	the	latter	on	the	computational	problem	of	
“factoring-then-tracking”	that	the	vision	system	must	to	some	extent	be	solv-
ing	given	that	colour	constancy	exists	(and	thus	involves	more	computation	
and	physics	 than	neurophysiology).	However,	as,	e. g.,	Brainard	(2004)	has	
emphasized,	 the	 two	are	merely	 focusing	on	different	aspects	of	 the	 same	
puzzle.	 Any	 plausible	 physiological	mechanism	 is	 presumably	 implement-
ing	an	appropriate	computational	solution	(given	the	framework	of	cognitive	
science),	and	any	computational	solution	could	be	utilized	by	a	colour	vision	
system,	and	one	of	them	is being	so	utilized	by	our	vision	system.	
	 	 On	the	other	hand	there	are	differences	in	what	is	the	focus	of	study	with-
in	these	approaches.	For	example	those	working	within	the	mechanistic	ap-
proach	are	often	embroiled	 in	how	adaptation	works	 in	our	vision	 system,	
whereas	those	working	within	the	computational	approach	are	embroiled	in	
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surface	 features	 (e. g.,	 classes	of	 reflectances),	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	
colours	can	be	illumination-dependent.13
In	response	one	might	suggest	that	the	computational	approach	
simply	needs	 to	be	modified	to	allow	that	 the	vision	system	tracks	
not	only	reflectances	but	also	incident	illuminants,	and	Reflectance	
Physicalism	needs	to	be	supplemented	with	an	appropriate	account	
of	represented colour (as	opposed	to	actual	colour),	namely	where	rep-
resented	but	not	actual	colour	is	illumination-dependent.14	But	these	
concessions	do	not	 resolve	at	 least	one	core	challenge:	 in	what	 re-
spect	 is	 a	 constant	 colour	present	 to	 one	 in	 experiences	 involving	
colour	constancy?	For	example,	during	some	constancy	perceptions	
involving	a	partly	shadowed	surface	it	is	not	a	stretch	to	suggest	that	
I	see	the	shadow	to	be	on the	surface	of	 that	 thing.	 If	 I	do	see	that	
surface	to	be	uniformly	coloured,	then	in	what	sense	is	that	constant	
surface	colour	phenomenally	or	intentionally	“present”	to	me	in	ex-
perience	if	I	am	seeing	something	else,	something	variable,	to	be	on	
that	surface?	
The	computational	approach	is	designed	to	answer	computational	
questions,	not	experiential	ones.	Thus	when	it	is	modified	to	allow	for	
the	dual-tracking	of	reflectances	and	incident	illuminants,	an	account	
of	how	these	elements	are	both	experienced	while	a	constant	colour	
is	 also	 experienced	 does	 not	 suggest	 itself.	 Though	 illuminating	 in	
many	other	respects,	we	should	not	expect	developments	in	compu-
tational	psychology	to	straightforwardly	deliver	answers	to	such	ques-
tions	about	colour	experience.	A	Reflectance	Physicalism	that	allows	
for	 represented	colour	 to	be	 illumination-dependent	 fares	no	better.	
If	anything,	it	suggests	that	we	experience	not	constant	but	variable	
colours,	and	if	we	don’t	experience	constant	colours	in	a	wide	range	
13.	 Arend	&	Reeves	(1986),	and	Arend	(1993)	argue	for	the	impact	of	illumina-
tion	on	perceived	colour,	although	in	my	view	do	not	offer	a	clear	positive	
account.
14.	 Hilbert	(2005)	has	effectively	made	this	concession,	although	I	will	argue	(§5)	
he	has	not	conceded	nearly	enough.
§1.2 Problem one: Experiencing illumination variations & experiencing them 
as colour variations. 
One	might	argue	that	what	I	have	called	the	traditional	computational	
approach	 to	 constancy	 is	 deeply	 flawed	 and	 that	 its	 purported	 sup-
port	for	Reflectance	Physicalism	is	an	illusion.11	Consider	the	question	
“How	does	the	nature	of	the	incident	light	impact	colour	experience dur-
ing	constancy	perceptions?”.	To	 this	point	nothing	directly	has	been	
said	about	the	matter.	All	that	has	been	said	is	that	illumination	varia-
tions	are	“present”	or	“exist”	or,	as	B&H	say,	they	are	“reaching	the	eye”,	
but	no	mention	of	how	those	are	present	in	experience,	phenomenally	
or	 intentionally,	has	been	offered.	Yet	we	know	that,	 in	some	sense,	
when	I	see	something	to	be	partly	shadowed	I	see	that	something	and 
that	shadow.	It	is	therefore	not	sufficient	to	say	that	the	vision	system	
factors	out	the	incident	and	reflectance	contributions	to	the	reflected	
light	and	tracks	the	latter,	for	to	some	extent	it	is	also	tracking	the	for-
mer.	What	else	could	seeing	the	shadow	mean	other	than	seeing	that	
illumination	variation?	The	idea	that	the	colour	vision	system’s	chief	
goal	or	achievement	is	to	track	reflectances	is	mistaken.12
Consider	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 illumination	 variations	 can	 yield	 per-
ceived	variations	in	colour,	but	need	not	thereby	eliminate	colour	con-
stancy.	At	times	a	room	illuminated	by	a	red	twilight	can	still	be	seen	to	
have	its	familiar	surface	colours	in addition to the	perceived	red	corre-
sponding	to	the	incident	light.	Thus	colour	constancy	can	involve	per-
ceived	constant	and perceived	variable	colours.	Colour	constancy,	rath-
er	than	supporting	the	idea	that	colours	are	illumination-independent	
11.	 Some	may	also	object	that	my	portrayal	misrepresents	the	views	of	at	least	
some	computational	theorists	(for	example	see	again	Chirimuuta	2008).	As	
stated	earlier,	my	aim	is	to	motivate	influential	philosophical	views,	 in	this	
case	 to	explain	why	scientific	research	 in	colour	constancy	was	 thought	 to	
justify	reflectance	physicalism.	A	portrayal	of	the	sort	I	have	given	is	needed	
to	explain	the	influence	computational	approaches	to	colour	constancy	have	
had	on	reflectance	physicalists	like	B&H	and	Tye,	regardless	of	the	accuracy	
of	that	portrayal.
12.	 Jameson	&	Hurvich	(1989)	for	example	argued	for	this	among	other	claims.
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one	is	seeing	the	former	through	the	latter.	I	suggest	that	“present”	can	
here	be	read	both	intentionally	and	phenomenally.	We	are	intentional-
ly	and	phenomenally	presented	in	experience	with	layers of colour,	one	
through	another.	The	 idea	 is,	at	 least	 logically,	 readily	generalizable	
to	 Illuminant	 cases:	 in	 the	 twilight	 case	we	 see	 the	 room’s	 constant	
surface	colours	through	the	red	of	the	twilight,	and	in	the	shadow	case	
we	see	the	object’s	constant	surface	colour	through	the	colour	of	the	
shadow.	This	Colour	Layering	approach	 thus	underwrites	a	general	
analysis	of	 the	 respect	 in	which	constant	and	variable	elements	are	
phenomenally	and	intentionally	present	to	one	in	experiences	involv-
ing	colour	constancy.	Let	us	flesh	it	out.
§2 Balancing theoretical pressures
The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	tease	apart	the	relation	between	colour	
constancy	and	colour	ontology	and	epistemology	on	one	hand,	and	
colour	 constancy	and	colour	experience	on	 the	other.	 It	 strikes	me	
of	everyday	scenarios,	 then	colour	constancy	cannot	be	offered	as	a	
reason	to	be	a	Reflectance	Physicalist.15
§1.3 Problem two: Colour constancy without illumination variation. 
Matters	are	still	more	difficult,	for	a	host	of	colour	constancy	percep-
tions	 have	 nothing to do with illumination variations. Look	 at	 a	 book	
through	a	pint	of	amber	beer	and	at	times	you	see	not	only	the	beer’s	
amber	but	also	 the	book’s	green	(Image	1,	Book	 through	beer).	The	
latter	 is	 a	 legitimate	 and	 straightforward	 instance	 of	 a	 constant	 per-
ceived	colour	despite	a	straightforward	and	robust	variation	in	one’s	
perception	of	that	colour,	yet	no	illumination	variation	is	responsible	
for	these	peculiarities.16	 I	will	call	colour	constancy	cases	of	this	sort	
colour Filter cases	 to	 distinguish	 them	 from	 colour	 Illuminant	 cases.	
They	include	constancy	perceptions	that	arise	by	looking	through	sun-
glasses,	 tinted	windows,	fluids,	 and	so	on.	Confining	discussions	of	
colour	constancy	to	illumination	variations	is	useful	to	some	circum-
scribed	projects,	like	that	of	a	computational	constancy	theorist	(e. g.,	
Wandell	1989)	who	is	looking	for	algorithms	that	might	indicate	how	
visual	processing	deals	with	illumination	changes	and	spectral	reflec-
tance	profiles	given	the	paucity	of	information	contained	in	the	colour	
signal.	But	anyone	purporting	to	utilize	or	give	an	account	of	colour	
constancy	proper,	 something	philosophical	concerns	demand,	can	af-
ford	no	such	luxury.	One’s	account	must	explicitly	contain	sufficient	
generality	to	incorporate	both	Illuminant	and	Filter	cases.
§1.4 A resolution. 
The	beer	case	additionally	brings	with	it	an	intriguing	orientation	to	
our	challenge:	what	is	present	is	the	book’s	colour	and	 the	beer’s	co-
lour,	and	the	respect	in	which	they	are	combined	in	experience	is	that	
15.	 See,	e.g.,	Cohen	(2008)	and	§5	below.
16.	 To	be	sure	illumination	variations	are	present	and	no	doubt	to	some	extent	
perceived.	However,	the	point	is	that	these	illumination	variations	are	sepa-
rate	from	the	kind	of	constancy	perception	generated	by	looking	through	the	
beer	to	the	book.	I	will	suppress	this	qualification	throughout.
Image	1,	Book	through	beer.
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one	but	by	hypothesis	would	be	before	one	were	circumstances	differ-
ent	(e. g.,	were	illumination	conditions	to	be	altered).	In	this	way	the	
variable	element	in	colour	constancy	is	treated	as	primitive	and	con-
stitutive	of	the	colours	one	experiences	before	one,	and	the	constant	
aspect	is	treated	as	a	derived	prediction	about	the	colours	one	would	
experience	before	one	in	some	other	(related)	circumstance.	It	 is	no	
surprise	 that	Cohen	 (2009)	 elsewhere	defends	 a	 colour	 subjectivist	
ontology,	in	his	case	holding	that	colours	are	defined	relative	to	illu-
minations	and	a	host	of	other	factors.18
These	are	but	 two	of	 the	ways	 that	colour	constancy	can	be	ana-
lyzed.	It	is	instructive	to	highlight	that	each	way	embodies	a	bias	that	
favours	 the	broader	colour	ontology	 favoured	by	 its	authors.	B&H’s	
claim	 that	 in	 constancy	 scenarios	 experienced	 (“perceived”)	 colours	
are	stable	or	constant	provides	reason	to	regard	colours	as	invariant	
across	 the	 changes	 inherent	 in	 the	 case	 (e. g.,	 illumination	changes).	
Cohen’s	claim	that	in	constancy	scenarios	experienced	“occurrent”	co-
lours	are	variable	provides	reason	to	regard	colours	as	variant	across	
the	relevant	changes.
In	reaction	one	might	claim	that	these	biases	cannot	be	eliminated	
from	philosophical	endeavours,	or	perhaps	they	are	welcome,	or	per-
haps	they	are	of	little	significance.	For	example,	one	might	believe	that	
an	analysis	of	a	notion	like	colour	constancy	can	only	be	judged	in	a	
broader	context	that	includes	a	particular	colour	ontology.	In	response	
one	might	worry	 that	 this	 commitment	makes	 judgements	 about	 a	
proposed	analysis	hostage	 to	a	 further	 judgement	 that	 is	difficult	 to	
adjudicate,	 namely	 a	 judgement	 about	 the	 overall	 strengths	 of	 one	
colour	theory	relative	to	another.	These	are	well-known	problems	in	
meta-philosophy.	In	this	case	we	can	do	otherwise:	we	can	formulate	
an	analysis	that	does	not	straightforwardly	favour	one	colour	ontology	
over	another.	I	will	go	further	and	formulate	an	analysis	that	does	not	
18.	 I	take	colour	subjectivism	to	include	relationalist	views	on	which	colours	in-
herently	or	 constitutively	depend	on	 the	mind	and	 the	world	 (e. g.,	Cohen	
2009),	and	mentalist	views	on	which	colours	inherently	or	constitutively	de-
pend	only	on	the	mind	(e. g.,	Hardin	1988,	McGilvray	1994).
that	 available	 accounts	of	 constancy	have	each	been	 formulated	 to	
support	a	particular	ontology	(§2.1).	This	 is	avoidable	and	I	believe	
should	be	avoided	if	possible.	The	first	stumbling	block	is	to	locate	
the	VC	Challenge	and	potential	solutions	to	it	squarely	within	our	ac-
count	of	colour	experience	(§2.2).	From	here	we	can	understand	that	
problem	on	its	own	(§3),	so	to	speak,	and	articulate	a	general	solution	
while	 remaining	 quite	 neutral	 on	 commitments	 to	 colour	 ontology	
and	epistemology	(§4).
§2.1 Ontological bias. 
Regardless	of	B&H’s	ultimate	commitment	to	their	definition	of	con-
stancy	 (“Stability	of	 the	perceived	 color	of	 a	 surface	across	 changes	
in	illumination	and	the	consequent	changes	in	the	light	reaching	the	
eye”),	 that	definition	favours	the	constant	element	over	the	variable	
one.	While	 the	 variable	 element	 (changes	 in	 illumination)	 is	 recog-
nized	as	physically	existing,	the	definition	implies	that	it	makes	no im-
pact	on	the	perceived	colour	of	a	surface.	As	mentioned	in	the	last	sec-
tion,	this	is	easily	seen	to	be	inaccurate	by	reflections	on	perceptions	
of	 shadows.	However,	 beyond	 that	 this	 definition	 biases	 us	 toward	
regarding	constancy	as	 supportive	of	objectivist	views	about	colour.	
The	reason	is	because,	at	minimum,	on	this	analysis	perceived	colour	
is	at	least	often	illumination-invariant,	and	thus	(assuming	colour	per-
ceptions	are	often	veridical)	we	have	reason	to	believe	that	colour	is	
illumination-invariant,	a	well-known	tenet	of	objectivist	colour	views.
By	 contrast	 Cohen’s	 (2008)	 account	 of	 constancy	 splits	 colour	
contents	 into	 “occurrent”	 and	 “counterfactual”	 ones.	 He	 claims	 that	
evidence	of	perceived	colour	variations	are	expressions	of	the	former,	
while	evidence	of	perceived	colour	constancies	are	expressions	of	the	
latter.17	Roughly,	the	idea	is	that	during	constancy	perceptions	the	ex-
perienced	colours	that	are	there	before	one	(i. e.,	occurrent	or	instan-
tiated)	 vary	 across	 illumination	 changes,	 and	 evidence	 for	 constant	
colours	 in	 these	scenarios	 is	evidence	of	colours	 that	are	not before	
17.	 ‘Evidence’	for	example	includes	data	from	everyday	experience	and	from	ex-
periments	such	as	those	utilizing	asymmetric	matching	tasks.
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the	colours	that	are	present	before	one	(occurrent	contents),	and	ex-
periences	of	 the	colours	 that	are	not	before	one	but	would	be	were	
matters	otherwise	(counterfactual	contents).	He	does	not	elaborate	on	
how	to	characterize	the	phenomenal	difference	between	experiences	
of	these	two	kinds	of	contents,	but	presumably	a	colour	that	occurs	in	
an	occurrent	content	is	experienced	as	there	or	real or	present before one, 
whereas	one	that	occurs	in	a	counterfactual	content	is	experienced	as	
not there/absent but	potentially there.	Given	this	framework	Cohen’s	key	
proposal	is	that	in	constancy	cases	variable	elements	of	colour	experi-
ence	are	found	in	occurrent	contents,	and	constant	elements	are	found	
in	 counterfactual	 contents.	 Thus,	 constant	 elements	 are	 not	 experi-
enced	as	present	(or	occurrent)	but	as	absent	(or	potentially	present).	
It	is	therefore	an	Absent	account,	and	given	the	importance	of	Cohen’s	
work	in	philosophy	of	colour,	it	will	serve	as	our	main	candidate	for	
such	an	account.	Accounts	which	leave	the	above	propositions	in	cog-
nition	can	in	general	be	substituted	at	will	in	what	follows.
I	will	shortly	propose	a	novel	Present	account	of	colour	constancy.	
I	 do	 so	 because	 the	Present	 accounts	 available	 are	 to	my	mind	 in-
adequate,	and	their	distinctness	from	colour	ontology	has	not	been	
articulated.	As	a	 result	 the	 full	power	of	Present	accounts	 remains	
underappreciated.
The	chief	difficulty	for	a	Present	account	is	to	accommodate	the	fact	
that	the	variable	element	in	constancy	scenarios	is	not	merely	“reach-
ing	 the	eye”,	but	 impacting	colour	experience	—	hence	B&H’s	defini-
tion	does	not	meet	this	challenge.	If	a	constant	colour	is	experienced	
across	something	like	an	illumination	variation,	and	the	illumination	
variation	 is	experienced,	 then	the	same	determinate	colour	must	be	
present	in	experience	(not	merely	in	the	world),	but	somehow	differ-
ently	present.	This	is	to	say	that	there	must	be	distinct	perspectives on 
the	experienced	 colour,	 and	 that	 this	 colour	and	 these	perspectives	
must	be	reflected	in	experience,	where	‘perspectives	on’	is	little	more	
than	a	term	for	the	difficulty	we	wish	to	overcome.	By	hypothesis	the	
experienced	colour	of	my	hat	 is	constant	when	viewed	 indoors	and	
then	outdoors.	However,	it	is	somehow	experientially	different:	when	
straightforwardly	favour	a	particular	perceptual	epistemology	(e. g.,	ac-
quaintance-based	or	representation-based).	Such	an	analysis	is	worth	
considering	 for	 this	 reason	 alone.	 If	 in	 addition	 it	 explains	 the	 phe-
nomenon	of	colour	constancy	at	least	as	well	as	its	competitors,	then	it	
deserves	a	privileged	place	in	our	discourse.
§2.2 Experiential realism & Present constancy.
An	underlying	philosophical	 issue	in	constancy	research	is,	 to	speak	
loosely,	whether	the	constant	element	is	perceptual/sensory or	judgmen-
tal.	The	idea	is	that	in	the	former	case	the	constant	element	is	present in 
or	part of perceptual	phenomenology	(or	representational	content	or	
the	items	of	acquaintance),	whereas	in	the	latter	the	constant	element	
is	absent but	inferred from	the	colour	elements	that	constitute	percep-
tual	phenomenology.	I	will	call	accounts	which	defend	the	former	for	a	
given	case	experientially realist or	Present constancy	accounts,	and those	
that	defend	 the	 latter	experientially anti-realist or	Absent constancy	ac-
counts.	In	case	there	is	doubt,	the	distinction	concerns	how	to	charac-
terize	colour	experience	in	constancy	cases,	and	not	necessarily	how	to	
characterize	colour	ontology.
Regardless	of	its	adequacy,	the	B&H	definition	of	constancy	is	expe-
rientially	realist,	for	according	to	it	in	constancy	cases	there	is	“stability	
of	the	perceived	color”.	By	hypothesis	a	straightforward	Absent	account	
would	contend	that	in	constancy	cases	perceptual	experience	consists	
only	of	variable	elements,	and	from	these	one	infers,	cognitively,	some	
proposition	 about	 a	 constant	 colour,	 perhaps	 <that	 thing’s	 colour	 is	
constant	though	not	currently	perceptually	so>	or	<that	thing’s	colour	
would	be	perceivably	constant	were	it	uniformly	illuminated>.	
A	 more	 sophisticated	 Absent	 view	 posits	 that	 the	 constant	 ele-
ments	 are	 in	 some	 sense	 absent	 yet	 still	 perceptual.	 One	 way	 of	
achieving	this	is	to	put	the	above	propositions	into	perceptual	content.	
Accounting	for	colour	constancy	by	putting	propositions	of	the	latter	
(counterfactual)	sort	into	perceptual	content	is	precisely	Cohen’s	pro-
posal,	rendering	his	account	experientially	anti-realist.	Let	me	briefly	
elaborate.	 For	Cohen,	 colour	 experience	 is	 split	 into	 experiences	 of	
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§3 Perspectives on colours
There	is	a	conceptual	problem	underlying	an	experientially	realist	or	
Present	understanding	of	colour	constancy,	 the	problem	of	articulat-
ing	viable	candidates	for	the	concept	perspectives on a colour.19	For	expe-
rienced	colours	to	be	in	some	sense	constant	and	in	some	sense	vari-
able	is	for	us	to	have	varying	perspectives	on	a	single	colour,	where	
both	the	constant	and	variable	aspects	are	identifiable	in	colour	phe-
nomenology.	I	aim	to	provide	a	fruitful	analysis	of	this	concept.	To	be	
forthcoming,	 the	 proposed	 analysis	 derives	 directly	 from	 the	 Layer-
ing	Thesis.	The	analysis	is	fruitful	because	it	requires	few	assumptions,	
does	not	offend	against	 the	 fundamental	 challenge	 for	 any	 such	an	
analysis	(see	§3.1),	and	elucidates	the	nature	of	colour	constancy	expe-
rience.	We	apply	this	analysis	to	colour	constancy	in	§4.	
§3.1 Fundamental tension.
Understanding	the	concept	perspectives on a colour is	particularly	prob-
lematic	 given	 the	 following	 tension.	On	one	hand	 there	 is	 intuitive	
motivation	 to	 say	 that	we	can	have	various	perspectives	on	a	given	
19.	 This	is	the	core	lesson	I	take	from	Hilbert	(2005)	and	Kalderon	(2008).	See	
also	Broackes	(2009)	and	Gert	(2010).	To	my	mind	all	of	these	contributions	
are	very	worthwhile,	but	none	of	them	develop	the	notion	in	a	manner	that	
is	satisfactory.	Kalderon’s	notion,	presentational aspect,	is	not	explicitly	defined	
in	 the	work	and	postulated	 to	 resolve	 the	 tension	between	metamers	 and	
constancy.	It	 is	not	developed	sufficiently	to	be	used	here.	Broackes’s	ideas,	
presented	in	the	final	sections	of	his	marvelous	paper,	are	explicitly	specula-
tive.	They	make	some	use	of	colour	layering,	but	are	not	systematic	enough	
to	extract	a	clean	analysis,	and	are	specifically	tailored	to	illuminate	experi-
ences	of	colour	dichromats.	The	views	of	Hilbert	and	Gert	are	discussed	in	§5.
	 	 Another	alternative	applies	the	notion	of	a	mode of presentation to	colour	
(e. g.,	Chalmers	2006	and	Thompson	2006,	2009).	I	regard	this	as	an	Objec-
tivist	alternative.	Further,	this	notion	is	typically	introduced	in	contexts	dis-
tinct	from	that	of	the	present	contribution,	for	example	to	accommodate	the	
possibility	of	spectrum	inversion.	As	remarked	at	the	outset,	the	relativities	
central	to	constancy	perceptions	are	not	subjective	in	the	way	that	those	rel-
evant	to	spectrum	inversion	are.	This	means	that	the	solution	to	one	should	
or	at	 least	could	be	distinct	 from	that	of	 the	other.	We	should	 for	example	
be	able	to	formulate	solutions	to	the	VC	Challenge	that	do	not	commit	us	to	
anything	with	regard	to	spectrum	inversion.	We	will	therefore	not	consider	
modes	of	presentation	in	any	detail.
viewed	indoors	the	experienced	colour	is	experienced	from	one	per-
spective,	and	when	viewed	outdoors	 it	 is	experienced	 from	another	
perspective.	 Similarly	 for	 the	 book:	 by	 hypothesis	 the	 experienced	
green	 is	 constant	 across	 the	 image,	 but	 experienced	 from	 different	
perspectives	because	of	the	beer.	To	be	explicit,	the	point	isn’t	that	by	
hypothesis	the	objective	colour	of	the	hat/book	is	constant,	it	is	that	
by	hypothesis	the	experienced	colour	is	constant	—	the	issue	is	one	of	
colour	experience,	not	of	ontology.	This	is	the	required	orientation	for	
persons	who	are	interested	in	developing	a	Present	account	of	colour	
constancy.	What	we	need	is	an	appropriate	analysis	of	the	concept	hav-
ing a perspective on a colour (in experience).	I	will	suggest	one	shortly.
The	broad	point	of	developing	an	account	of	Present	constancy	is	
not	to	imply	that	all	colour	constancy	cases	are	Present	constancy	cas-
es.	It	is	instead	to	put	forth	an	experientially	realist	account	alongside	
an	experientially	anti-realist	one	(perhaps	Cohen’s)	and	consider	the	
vast	array	of	colour	constancy	cases	with	the	aim	of	categorizing	some	
(or	none	or	all)	as	experientially	realist	and	some	(or	none	or	all)	as	
experientially	anti-realist.	I	cannot	engage	in	this	broader	project	here,	
for	it	is	an	immense	one.	My	personal	view	is	that	many	colour	con-
stancy	cases	should	be	interpreted	realistically,	and	at	least	some	anti-
realistically,	and	I	will	indicate	this	where	appropriate.	My	primary	in-
terest	is	in	the	narrower	task	of	putting	forth	a	more	credible	account	
of	Present	constancy	than	is	currently	available,	in	particular	one	that	
is	less	biased	in	favour	of	colour	objectivism.
§2.3 Permissive and realistic. 
I	therefore	wish	to	offer	an	analysis	of	colour	constancy	that	is	both	
experientially	realist	but	broadly	theoretically	permissive.	It	is	experi-
entially	realist	in	that	constant	colours	are	present	in	experience	(not	
merely	counterfactually	postulated)	in	at	least	some	colour	constancy	
scenarios.	 It	 is	 theoretically	permissive	because	 it	 is	 consistent	with	
not	only	objectivist	but	also	subjectivist	 colour	ontologies	and	with	
various	perceptual	epistemologies.	The	account	centers	on	analyzing	
the	concept	having a perspective on a colour.	It	is	to	this	that	we	now	turn.
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aspects	or	properties	is	coherent,	but	these	properties	do	not	generate	
the	ontological	space	to	 introduce	the	notion	of	there	being	various	
perspectives	on	a	single	colour.	Instead	the	recognition	of	colour	prop-
erties	like	HSL	does	the	reverse:	it	reinforces	the	intuition	that	there	
is	only	one	perspective	to	be	had	on	a	colour,	“and	there	is	an	end	of	
the	matter!”
It	is	no	surprise	that	whereas	the	Objectivist’s	Sentiment	is	sugges-
tive	of	colour	objectivism,	Russell’s	Sentiment	is	suggestive	of	colour	
subjectivism.	If	anytime	an	aspect	of	a	colour	changes	the	colour	itself	
changes,	then	whenever	variations	in	perceptual	context	impact	expe-
rienced	colour,	as	illumination	variations	often	do,	that	impact	is	argu-
ably	not	merely	on	experienced	colour,	it	is	on	colour	simpliciter.	This	
outcome	is	naturally	allied	with	subjectivist	views,	since	peculiarities	
of	individual	perceivers	can	impact	experienced	colour.
One	way	to	react	to	the	tension	between	the	Objectivist’s	and	Rus-
sell’s	 Sentiments	 is	 to	 concede	 defeat	 and	 allow	 the	 respective	 par-
ties	to	part	ways.	Here	each	party	operationally	assumes	that	colours	
do	(or	do	not)	admit	of	perspectives,	and	utilizes	that	assumption	in	
formulating	 a	 theory	 of	 colour.	 The	 resulting	 theories	 can	 then	 be	
compared	and	hopefully	a	victor	will	emerge.	Unfortunately,	judging	
which	theory	is	victor	will	be	difficult,	given	that	each	side	will	see	a	
crucial	assumption	that	the	other	has	made	as	illicit,	and	hence	be	apt	
to	not	find	the	explanations	and	analyses	that	assumption	is	utilized	
for	compelling.23	While	this	dialectical	standoff	might	seem	unavoid-
able	and	unresolvable,	consider	a	different	reconstruction.
The	Objectivist’s	Sentiment	allows	that	a	single	colour	(blue)	can	
give	rise	to	different	colour	experiences	(blue,	then	purple)	in	various	
contexts,	and	asserts	 that	 this	 is	a	 legitimate	sense	 in	which	we	can	
have	different	perspectives	on	a	colour.	Applied	to	colour	constancy	
this	 yields	 an	 Absent	 or	 experientially	 anti-realist	 account,	 for	 the	
stability	of	the	colour	on	which	the	subject	has	different	perspectives	
is	not	 reflected	 in	successive	experiences,	 it	 is	 instead	postulated	as	
23.	 See	Brown	(in	preparation-a)	for	a	detailed	example.
colour,	as	indicated	for	example	by	phrases	like	“this	blue	thing	looks	
blue	in	daylight,	purple	in	red	light,	and	so	on”.20	For	ease	of	reference	
call	this	The Objectivist’s Sentiment.	Although	this	intuition	doesn’t	en-
tail	a	realist	or	objectivist	view	about	colour,	it	is	suggestive	of	one.	If	
colour	is	a	property	of	a	thing	that	one	can	have	different	perspectives	
on	across	distinct	contexts	(e. g.,	under	different	 illuminations),	 then	
colour	is	invariant	across	these	contexts	(e. g.,	 illuminations).	That	is,	
what	 is	changing	across	 these	contexts	 is	not	 the	colour	but	merely	
the	perspective	one	has	on	it.	In	this	way	colour	is	more	objective	than	
what	is	variable	across	these	contexts.	Hence	the	sentiment	is	sugges-
tive	of	a	degree	of	colour	objectivism.
On	 the	other	hand	 there	 is	 intuitive	motivation	 to	deny	 that	we	
can	 have	 perspectives	 on	 a	 given	 colour,	 to	 say	 for	 example	 that	 if	
something	appears	blue	at	one	time,	and	purple	at	another,	then	we	
haven’t	witnessed	different	perspectives	on	 the	object’s	 blue	 colour,	
but	 instead	the	perceived	colour	 itself	has	changed.	A	denial	of	 this	
sort	is	put	forth	by	Russell	in	a	general	form	when	he	declares	that	a	
“colour	which	presents	a	different	aspect	is	a	different	colour,	and	there	
is	an	end	of	the	matter”	(Russell,	1913,	79).21	Call	this	Russell’s Sentiment. 
Here	 is	one	way	 to	develop	Russell’s	 thought.	Consider	 the	various	
properties	that	have	been	offered	to	describe	colours,	most	famously	
hue,	 saturation,	and	 lightness	 [HSL].22	Using	such	sets	of	properties	
we	can	define	a	colour	space	that	by	hypothesis	uniquely	locates	each	
colour	at	a	point	in	that	space.	Given	a	colour	we	can	consider	altering	
an	“aspect”	of	it,	for	example	its	hue,	saturation,	or	lightness.	However,	
such	an	alteration	does	not	involve	presenting	a	different	aspect	of	or	
perspective	on	that	colour,	but	instead	involves	moving	from	that	co-
lour	to	a	distinct	one.	Thus,	Russell	claims,	the	idea	of	colours	having	
20.	Cf.	Dawes	Hicks	(1912),	Burnyeat	(1979/80),	Dummett	(1979),	Demopoulos	
(2003).
21.	 I	 take	 this	quoted	 remark	 to	have	a	general	 appeal.	 It	 in	no	ways	 requires	
sense-datum	theory	and	is	more	appealing	for	colour	(even	today)	than	for	
shape.
22.	 Kuehni	(2003)	surveys	an	impressive	range	of	colour	spaces	that	have	been	
proposed	since	antiquity.
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In	a	manner	of	speaking,	our	parties	are	now	conceptually	disen-
gaged	 from	each	other.	However,	 rather	 than	viewing	 this	as	an	un-
avoidable	outcome	from	philosophical	debate,	this	resconstruction	of	
why	that	disengagement	arose	suggests	how	reengagement	is	achiev-
able	—	via	a	Present	conception	of	perspectives on a colour.	
§3.2. Perspective through interdependence. 
Rather	 than	 explore	 various	means	 of	 generating	 a	 Russell-friendly	
analysis	of	the	concept	perspectives on a colour let	me	state	my	proposal,	
that	embodied	by	the	Layering	Thesis:
Colour Layering Thesis:	 we	 can	 experience	 two	 colours	
along	a	single	line	of	sight,	one	(opaque)	colour	through	
the	other	(transparent)	colour.
The	Thesis	intrinsically	contains	an	analysis	of	perspectives on a colour:	
when	you	experience	one	colour	 through	another	you	are	not	expe-
riencing	 either	 colour	 simpliciter, you	 instead	 are	 experiencing	 each	
colour	from	a	perspective,	the	opaque	colour	through	this	particular	
transparent	one,	and	the	transparent	one	by	experiencing	this	particu-
lar	opaque	one	through	it.	One’s	experience	of	each	is	interdependent	
on	 one’s	 experience	 of	 the	 other.	 And	 as	 one	 experiences	 differing	
opaque	 colours	 through	 this	 transparent	 colour,	 one	 gets	 differing	
perspectives	on	the	latter;	and	vice	versa.
This	analysis	of	perspectives on colours is	ontologically	very	liberal.	It	
is	consistent	with	colours	being	mental,	nowhere	instantiated,	mind-
independent,	 and	 inherently	 relational.	 It	 is	 consistent	with	 colours	
being	primitive	or	reducible	to	some	physical	property.	It	is	consistent	
with	colours	themselves	being	definable	by	reference	to	hue,	satura-
tion,	and	lightness	alone,	or	by	reference	to	higher-dimensional	struc-
tures,	or	with	colours	not	having	intrinsic	features.	It	is	also	consistent	
with	various	colour	epistemologies,	 in	particular	making	no	commit-
ment	to	colours	being	experienced	via	acquaintance	or	representation.	
Finally,	 it	 is	 independent	from	various	other	colour	phenomena.	For	
underlying	or	giving	rise	to	these	experiences.	Thus	the	blueness	of	
the	blue	object	is	only	experienced	when	the	object	looks	blue.	When	
it	 looks	 purple,	 blue	 is	 not	 present	 in	 experience	 in	 any	 straightfor-
ward	sense;	its	existence	is	a	postulate,	whether	legitimate	or	not,	that	
outstrips	experience.	
I	suggest	that	what	is	most	objectionable	to	the	adherents	of	Rus-
sell’s	Sentiment	is	not	the	fact	that	the	Objectivist	view	appeals	to	a	
conception	of	perspectives on a colour,	but	the	Absent	character	of	that	
conception.	The	reason	is	plain:	an	Absent	conception	of	perspectives 
on a colour	 cannot	 in	 any	 direct	way	 provide	 evidence	 for	 one	 actu-
ally	 having	 different	 perspectives	 on	 a	 colour.	 The	Russellian	 Senti-
mentalist	 thus	views	the	conception	as	 inherently	question-begging,	
and	any	colour	objectivism	founded	on	it	as	inheriting	this.24	But	this	
concern,	 legitimate	as	 it	 is,	does	not	 license	the	conclusion	that	any	
“colour	which	 presents	 a	 different	 aspect	 is	 a	 different	 colour”.	 It	 in-
stead	motivates	a	preference	for	a	Present	conception	of	perspectives on 
a colour,	a	conception	that	places	both	the	stable	colour	and the	varying	
perspectives	one	has	on	it	in	experience	simultaneously.	To	date	nei-
ther	the	Russellian	nor	the	Objectivist	has	provided	a	means	of	doing	
this,	 setting	 the	 stage	 for	a	dialectical	gap:	 the	Russellian	maintains	
that	evidence	for	there	being	perspectives	on	a	colour	must	be	drawn	
from	colour	experience,	and	finding	no	model	for	this	rejects	such	per-
spectives;	the	Objectivist	maintains	that	perspectives	on	a	colour	must	
be	possible,	and	finding	no	model	for	extracting	this	from	experience	
opts	for	an	Absent	conception	of	such	perspectives.	
24.	A	classic	dispositionalist	 response	 is	 to	utilize	 the	Objectivist’s	 conception	
and	identify	one	of	the	variable	experienced	colours	with	the	real	colour	of	
the	thing	(e. g.,	the	one	experienced	in	“normal	conditions”).	The	Russellian	
Sentimentalist’s	response	(defended,	e. g.,	in	Problems of Philosophy,	by	Hardin,	
1988	and	elsewhere,	and	Cohen,	2009)	is	to	deny	that	there	is	any	principled	
means	of	sustaining	such	a	claim.	I	do	not	wish	to	contribute	to	this	debate,	
although	I	am	inclined	to	side	with	Russellians.	My	point	is	that	this	response,	
whether	acceptable	or	not,	 concedes	 that	 there	 is	not	a	constant	colour	 in	
one’s	phenomenology	across	 the	relevant	circumstances	and	 then	seeks	 to	
find	a	way	around	the	ensuing	problems.	I	aim	to	not	make	this	concession.
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(1)	Illumination	variations	must	not	only	“reach	they	eye”,	they	
must	be	something	that	we	can	experience	and something	
that	can	yield	variations	in	experienced	colour	(§1).
(2)	Colour	 constancy	 can	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 filter	 variations	
in	 addition	 to	 illumination	 variations	 (§1).	 Our	 account	
should	be	general	enough	to	explain	both,	and	to	explain	
experiential	similarities	between	them.
(3)	Theoretical	permissiveness:	colour	constancy	should	be	ex-
pressible	in	virtually	any	colour	ontology	and	colour	epis-
temology.	An	account	that	is	consistent	with	and	express-
ible	 within	 various	 ontologies	 and	 epistemologies	 is,	 all	
else	being	equal,	preferable	(§2).
(4)	 Experiential	 realism:	 by	 hypothesis	 experienced	 constant	
colours	need	not	merely	be	experiences	expressing	a	coun-
terfactual	colour;	 they	can	be	experiences	of	colours	 that	
are	before	one	(occurrent	or	present	colours).	For	ease	of	
reference	 the	 latter	 are	 deemed	 instances	 of	 Present con-
stancy	(§2).
(5)	(4)	demands	an	analysis	of	perspectives on a colour where	both	
that	colour	and	those	perspectives	are	reflected	in	experi-
ence.	Non-question-begging	analyses	must	satisfy	Russell’s	
Sentiment	(§3).
Some	readers	may	object	to	one	or	more	of	these	constraints.	At	this	
point	I	will	presume	each	constraint	has	adequate	merit.26
§4.2 Layered constancy. 
The	conception	of	perspectives on a colour	derived	from	the	Layering	The-
sis	yields	an	account	of	colour	constancy	that	meets	these	constraints.	
The	account	can	be	simply	stated.	Assume	a	subject	experiences	two	
26.	Cohen	(2008)	identifies	some	desiderata	for	accounts	of	colour	constancy,	all	
of	which	are	met	by	the	account	that	follows.	To	maintain	a	reasonable	length	
I	leave	these	details	to	the	reader.
example,	it	can	be	held	with	or	without	commitment	to	the	possibility	
of	spectrum	inversion,	it	is	consistent	with	the	existence	of	simultane-
ous	and	successive	colour	contrast	effects	(even	when	those	effects	oc-
cur	in	constancy	scenarios),	and	so	on.	What	this	proposal	requires	is	
the	application	of	the	distinction	between	transparency	and	opaque-
ness	to	colour.	Although	some	developed	colour	theories	may	reject	
this	application,	there	is	no	antecedent	reason	why	most	if	not	all	colour	
ontologies	and	accounts	of	colour	experience	cannot	provisionally	ac-
cept	it.	The	Layering	Thesis	entails	a	conception	of	perspectives on co-
lours	that	is broadly	theory-neutral. 25
This	 analysis	 arguably	 also	 satisfies	 Russell’s	 Sentiment.	My	 sug-
gestion	is	not that	experiencing	something	to	be	purple	now	and	blue	
earlier	provides	evidence	 for	our	having	different	perspectives	on	a	
colour.	It	 is	also	not that	there	are	features	of	some	colour	itself	that	
can	be	modified	to	generate	perspectives	on	it.	In	the	context	of	colour	
layering,	the	aspects	of	a	perceived	colour	that	can	be	changed	with-
out	changing	the	colour	itself	are	aspects	belonging	to	some	distinct	
colour	that	one	is	either	looking	through	to	the	target	colour,	or	seeing	
behind	 the	 target	 colour.	 I	 suggest	 that	even	Russell	would	be	 chal-
lenged	to	reject	the	proposal.
§4 Layered experience and colour constancy
§4.1 Taking stock. 
We	seek	an	account	of	colour	constancy	that	meets	several	constraints:
25.	 A	full	detailing	of	how	this	account	is	consistent	with	various	colour	ontolo-
gies,	epistemologies	and	additional	colour	phenomena	has	been	excised	due	
to	 length	considerations.	My	point	 is	not	that	all	ontological	and	epistemo-
logical	views	and	all	accounts	of	particular	colour	phenomena	will	accommo-
date	the	Layering	thesis	with	the	same	ease	or	in	the	same	way.	My	point	is	
merely	one	of	consistency.	For	ease	of	discussion	I	will	largely	focus	on	colour	
objectivism	in	the	text	and	often	presuppose	representationalism.	Where	it	
seems	particularly	helpful	to	re-assert	intertheoretic	consistency	I	will	do	so,	
usually	in	footnotes.
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similar.	We	should	expect	that	some	Filter	and	Illuminant	cases	will	in-
volve	perceptually	similar	experiences,	some	will	not.	These	similari-
ties	and	differences	will	have	to	be	itemized	and	incorporated	into	a	
full	theory.	The	point	is	that	the	Layering	account	explains	both	Filter	
and	Illuminant	cases	as	instances	of	the	same	phenomenon,	and	has	
the	resources	to	accommodate	cases	where	the	involved	experiences	
are perceptually	similar.
While	Layering	Present	 constancy	 is	 simply	 stated,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	it	occurs	may	require	extended	discussion.	 It	 is	reasonable	to	
posit	 that	 the	book-beer	 image	 can	prompt	perceivers	 to	 engage	 in	
Layering	Present	experiences	in	which	the	perceiver	experiences	both	
the	green	of	the	book	and	the	amber	of	the	beer	along	the	same	line	of	
sight.28	I	presume	that	this	suggestion	is	not	overly	controversial,	nor	
is	the	suggestion	that	various	Filter	cases	—	constancy	cases	involving	
opaque	objects	that	are	viewed	through	colour	filters	—	are	prima facie 
susceptible	to	a	layering	analysis.	The	extension	of	the	account	to	Il-
luminant	cases	may	be	more	controversial,	so	I	will	 treat	 the	matter	
separately	(§4.4.1).	This	being	said,	we	should	accept	that,	moving	for-
ward,	the	extent	to	which	perceivers	engage	in	Layered	experiences	in	
constancy	scenarios	(as	opposed	for	example	to	Cohen-style	counter-
factual	ones)	is	subject	to	further	experimental	and	theoretical	study.	
As	mentioned	in	§2,	the	primary	role	of	this	philosophical	contribution	
is	not	 to	settle	 this	 issue,	 it	 is	 to	articulate	a	model	 that	satisfies	the	
above	goals,	has	adequate	explanatory	power	(see	below)	and	fares	
at	least	as	well	as	its	rivals	(§5).	Let	me	proceed,	therefore,	to	increase	
the	account’s	flexibility.
§4.3 Deviations from complete layered experiences. 
Further	support	for	our	account	emerges	when	we	consider	the	vari-
ous	possibilities	it	predicts.	To	this	point	we	have	focused	on	layered	
28.	 I	say	that	the	image	“can”	induce	such	experiences	because	I	believe	that	it	
need	not	do	so.	The	qualification	is	needed	because	of	 the	role	perceptual	
ambiguity	can	play	in	these	contexts.	However,	as	mentioned	at	the	outset,	
incorporating	perceptual	ambiguity	into	this	discussion	must	be	dealt	with	in	
another	work.
colour	layers:	one	opaque	colour	through	one	transparent	colour.	As-
sume	one	of	these	layers	changes,	the	other	remains	constant,	and	the	
subject	experiences	exactly	that.	It	follows	that	the	subject	has	engaged	
in	 an	 experientially	 realistic	 colour	 constancy	 scenario:	 the	 constant	
colour	is	a	constituent	of	what	she	experiences.	Call	it	a	Layered (Con-
stancy) scenario, and	the	experiences	such	a	subject	undergoes	Layered 
(Constancy) experiences. The	constant	colour	is	not	 inferred	from	what	
she	experiences;	it	is	not	explained	by	postulating	an	expressed	coun-
terfactual	 content.	The	 constant	 colour	 is	 simply	a	 constituent	of	 ex-
perienced	colour.	Thus,	(4)	is	satisfied.	(5)	is	satisfied	by	virtue	of	the	
account	deriving	from	the	Layering	Thesis,	which	itself	satisfies	(5).
Furthermore,	given	that	this	conception	of	constancy	only	rests	on	
a	conservative	extension	of	the	Layering	Thesis,	it	is	as	easily	formu-
lable	 in	 subjectivist	 colour	 ontologies	 (e. g.,	 sense-datum	 theory)	 as	
in	objectivist	ones	 (e. g.,	objectivist	physicalism),	and	amenable	 to	a	
variety	of	perceptual	theories	(e. g.,	representationalism,	indirect	real-
ism,	naïve	realism)	and	perceptual	phenomena.	For	example,	it	does	
not	matter	whether	 the	 layers	are	 sense-data	or	physical	objects,	or	
whether	 one’s	 perceptions	 are	 best	 described	 via	 representation	 or	
acquaintance.	All	 that	matters	 is	 that	one	engages	 in	experiences	of	
colour	 layers	 in	which	one	of	 the	 layers	remains	constant	while	 the	
other	changes.	The	dictates	of	(3)	are	thus	met.
Finally,	 it	 should	be	obvious	 that	 this	 account	has	 the	generality	
needed	 to	accommodate	 (1)&(2).	 If we	 treat	 illuminants,	filters,	and	
(non-filter)	surfaces	as	colour-bearing	entities27,	and	treat	illuminants	
and	filters	as	transparent	and	surfaces	as	opaque,	then	we	can	explain	
both	 Illuminant	 and	 Filter	 constancy	 cases	 as	 instances	 of	 Layered	
Constancy	(satisfying	(2)),	and	we	can	treat	experienced	illumination	
variations	as	variations	in	experienced	colour	(satisfying	(1)).	Regard-
ing	(2),	the	point	isn’t	that	all	Filter	and	Illuminant	cases	will	be	exactly	
27.	 In	the	case	of	subjectivist	views	like	(e. g.)	a	sense-datum	theory	that	identi-
fies	colours	with	 features	of	 sense-data,	we	would	 treat	mind-independent	
entities	like	filters,	illuminants	and	non-filter	surfaces	not	as	distinct	colour-
bearers	but	as	distinct	 causes	of	differerent	 colour-bearing	sense-data,	or	as	
entities	erroneously	represented	as	colour-bearers	by	sense-data,	or	both.
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visual	 system	 to	 express	 a	 counterfactual	 content	 of	 the	 loose	 form	
<That	 book	would	 look	 yellow	were	matters	 otherwise>.	 Even	here,	
the	yellow	of	the	book	is	not	occurrently	experienced;	it	is	not	present	
in	or	among	the	colours	one	now	experiences.
I	do	not	take	the	fact	that	this	is	a	prima facie case	of	layering	failure	
to	be	controversial.30	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	mechanisms	of	the	vi-
sion	system	that	subserve	these	layering	failures	are	well-understood.	
It	is	not	to	say	that	the	boundaries	between	when	experienced	fusion	
will	occur	and	when	experienced	layering	will	occur	are	well-defined.	
On	the	contrary	I	expect	vagueness	is	as	forceful	here	as	in	heaps	and	
colour	category	boundaries.	Finally,	this	is	also	not	to	say	that	wheth-
er	we	should	interpret	this	fusion	as	an	instance	of	misperception	is	
30.	This	is	not	to	say	that	one	could	not	deny	that	there	is	layering	failure	here.	
Presumably	(e. g.)	some	naïve	realists	committed	to	non-relational	colour	ob-
jectivism	would	do	precisely	that.	However,	the	burden	would	be	on	those	
naïve	realists	(or	whomever)	to	make	their	case.	See	Brown	(in	preparation-b).
scenarios	 in	which	 the	 subject	 distinctly	 experiences	 two	 complete,	
layered	 colours	 (e. g.,	 the	 green	 of	 the	 book	 through	 the	 amber	 of	
the	 beer).	 Call	 these	 complete layered	 experiences.	 Here	 are	 some	
alternatives:	
A. Layering failure:	 the	subject	experiences	not	distinct	colours	
along	the	line	of	sight,	but	one	fused	colour.29 
B. Incomplete layered experiences:	 the	 subject	 completely	 experi-
ences	one	of	the	layered	colours,	but	only	partially	experi-
ences	the	other.
§4.3.1 Layering failure
Image	2	 (Fusion)	 is	of	what	we	would	pretheoretically	call	a	yellow	
book	as	seen	through	a	blue	transparency.	I	offer	it	as	an	image	that	
can	induce	an	experience	of	layering	failure.	Notice	the	small	yellow	
strip	 at	 the	 bottom.	 That	 is	 of	 the	 book	without	 the	mediated	 blue	
transparency.	Despite	my	best	efforts	I	cannot	experience	the	rest	of	
the	scene	as	consisting	of	a	yellow	book	behind	a	blue	transparency,	I	
instead	only	experience	green.	The	book	and	transparency	contribu-
tions	 to	colour	have	been	 fused	 together	 in	experience.	Thus	no	ex-
perienced	layering	occurs	(with	regard	to	these	elements).	As	a	result	
no	experienced	constancy	occurs	between	the	lower	strip	of	the	book	
and	the	rest	of	 it.	One	could	guess	that	a	constant	yellow	is	present,	
and	 thus	 report	colour	constancy,	but	 such	a	 report	would	not	be	a	
mere	description	of	one’s	experience,	 it	would	 instead	be	 the	 result	
of	a	substantive	inference	from	what	is	experientially	present.	If	one	
applies	Cohen’s	notion	of	a	counterfactual	colour	content	to	the	case,	
one	might	 search	 for	a	 situation	 in	which	 this	 image	prompts	one’s	
29.	An	additional	kind	of	layering	failure	occurs	when	one	experiences	one	of	the	
colours	and	not	the	other,	as	for	example	when	the	“transparent”	colour	suf-
ficiently	occludes	the	opaque	one	—	these	are	aptly	called	cases	of	Complete 
Occlusion.	This	can	also	occur	via	adaptation,	for	example	when	a	lightly	satu-
rated	filter	that	spans	one’s	field	of	view	becomes	invisible	due	to	adaptation.	
In	either	case	what	is	absent	is	the	experienced	variability	definitive	of	the	
kind	of	colour	constancy	that	is	of	philosophical	interest	(see	§1	again).	Thus	
this	kind	of	layering	failure	is	tangential	to	our	discussion.
Image	2,	Fusion.
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objects	 in	 the	 lot.)	What	we	do	not	experience	 is	 the	 full	colours	of	
the	objects	in	the	lot:	their	hues	(and	possibly	saturations)	are	not	ex-
perienced.	Nonetheless,	these	various	lightnesses	are	experienced	as	
features	 of	 the	 objects	 in	 the	 lot,	 not	 as	 features	 of	 the	 glass.32	 The	
experienced	colour	of	the	glass	is	not	infected	by	these	various	light-
nesses;	the	latter	are	colours	seen	through	the	glass’s	blue.	Thus	the	
glass	is	experienced	to	have	a	constant	shade	of	blue	—	Present	colour	
constancy	obtains.	
There	 are	 many	 aspects	 of	 this	 description	 that	 dissenters	 and	
skeptics	will	find	troublesome.	While	I	naturally	sympathize	with	the	
description,	what	is	of	primary	importance	to	philosophical	discourse	
32.	A	 subjectivist	 sense-datum	 theorist	may	 prefer	 a	 slightly	 different	 descrip-
tion	according	to	which	the	“full”	colours	of	the	distal	opaque	sense-data	are 
experienced.	That	is,	the	transparent	sense-datum	is	some	particular	shade	
of	blue,	but	the	opaque	sense-data	seen	through	the	blue	are	by	their	nature	
only	partial	colours,	i. e.,	these	sense-data	only	have	lightness	values,	but	not	
hues	 (or	 saturations).	 Either	way	Present	 constancy	obtains	 and	 it	 obtains	
because	of	layering.
uncontroversial.	This	 last	 issue	 is	 in	particular	very controversial	 for	
philosophy.	For	example,	a	colour	subjectivist	(e. g.,	sense-datum	the-
orist,	 relationalist,	etc.)	may	assert	 that	no	misperception	 is	present:	
you	experience	green	because	 that	 is	 the	 colour	being	perceived.	A	
representationalist	colour	objectivist	may	do	the	opposite:	you	experi-
ence	green	because	you	are	in	a	green-representing	state,	despite	the	
fact	that	there	is	yellow	and	blue	and	no	green	before	you.	My	point	
is	 that	 this	 vagueness,	 potential	 misperception,	 and	 our	 present	 ig-
norance	of	the	underlying	visual	mechanisms	should	not	be	taken	to	
undermine	the	prima facie difference	between	experienced	fusion	and	
experienced	layering,	and	the	direct	means	by	which	this	distinction	
illuminates	whether	or	not	there	is	Present	colour	constancy.	
§4.3.2 Incomplete layered experiences
Image	3	(Scene	through	blue	glass)	is	an	image	of	a	parking	lot	as	seen	
through	what	we	pretheoretically	designate	as	a	highly	saturated	blue	
pane	of	glass.	 I	propose	that	 it	 is	 inappropriate	 to	describe	a	 typical	
colour	experience	of	 this	 image	as	only	containing	various	different	
shades	of	blue.	 It	may	be	 that	 the	 image	can	 induce	such	an	experi-
ence	in	us,	but	I	instead	offer	this	as	an	image	that	can	prompt	us	to	
experience	partial	 layering	success	and	constancy	success	 involving	
the	transparent	colour.	Experiencing	colour	layers	in	this	case	is	(I	pro-
pose)	comparatively	simple:	one	experiences	the	glass	and	the	objects	
in	 the	parking	 lot	as	distinct,	and	experiences	 them	to	have	distinct	
colours	(i. e.,	at	least	distinct	colour	instances).	The	challenge	is	to	cor-
rectly	detail	this	experience.	
When	we	experience	layers while	looking	at	this	image	here	is	how	
I	suggest	we	describe	what	we	experience.	We	experience	the	glass’s	
colour.31	 It	 is	 a	 saturated	blue.	We	also	experience	 the	various	 light-
nesses	of	the	objects	in	the	parking	lot.	(If	you	doubt	this	spend	a	mo-
ment	 looking	at	 those	objects,	after	which	 it	should	be	easy	 to	start	
distinguishing	if	not	ordering	the	different	lightnesses	of	the	various	
31.	 Again,	a	subjectivist,	like	the	sense-datum	theorist,	will	substitute	“the	proxi-
mal	sense-datum’s	colour”	for	“the	glass’s	colour”,	and	so	on	for	what	follows.
Image	3,	Scene	through	blue	glass.
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glass,	and	not attributing	hues	or	saturations	to	the	latter,	because	the	
hues	and	saturations	of	the	latter	are	being	occluded	in	a	way	that	pre-
vents	our	vision	systems	from	correctly	discerning	those	values.	Per-
haps	we	experience	precisely	that.	There	is	no	antecedent	reason	why	
we	cannot	experience	only	part	of	a	thing’s	colour,	no	reason	why	we	
are	bound	to	say	that	when	we	experience	a	thing	to	have	some	co-
lour	property	(e. g.,	a	lightness)	we	must	experience	it	to	have	a	fully	
determinate	colour.	By	hypothesis	the	facts	are	straightforward:	the	
glass	is	blue;	and	the	objects	seen	through	it	have	various	colours,	all	
of	whose	hues	and	saturations	are	arguably	occluded	but	whose	light-
nesses	 are	not.	When	we	have	a	 layered	experience	when	viewing	
this	 image	our	 experience	 can	be	 interpreted	as	 recovering	exactly	
this,	and	nothing	more,	and	when	it	is	so	interpreted	no	perceptual	
error	occurs.	This	outcome	is	valuable	for	representationalists	(for	it	
pushes	us	to	consider	that	such	experiences	are	extremely	accurate)	
and	 for	 acquaintance-based	 views	 that	 exclude	 accuracy	 and	 error	
from	experience.	It	is	also	formulable	within	sense-datum	theory	and	
other	 subjectivist	 views	—	although	whether	 it	would	be	welcomed	
by	advocates	of	such	theories	I	will	not	pause	to	consider.
To	 respect	 symmetry	 we	 should	 consider	 the	 reverse	 possibil-
ity,	where	 the	natures	of	 the	opaque	colours	are	 fully	present	 in	ex-
perience	while	the	natures	of	the	transparent	ones	are	only	partially	
present.	 I	 submit	 that	 this	can	occur	when	the	 transparent	colour	 is	
only	lightly	saturated,	making	it	difficult	for	one’s	vision	system	to	rec-
ognize	that	colour.	It	can	also	occur	when	adaptation	factors	out	the	
transparent	colour	or	some	portion	of	it,	in	particular	when	a	lightly	
saturated	transparent	colour	spans	one’s	field	of	view	for	some	period	
of	time	(e. g.,	when	one	puts	on	sunglasses).	Given	the	latter	it	is	diffi-
cult	to	provide	images	for	these	effects.	Nonetheless,	although	adapta-
tions	of	this	sort	are	only	partially	understood,33	that	they	can	occur	is	
not	in	serious	doubt.	
33.	 See	again	Brainard	(2004).
about	colour	constancy	is	that	we	have	a	viable	model	for	how	we	can	
experience	 colour	 constancy	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 experienced	 colour	
variation.	Such	a	model	has	been	offered.	If	the	description	of	this	case	
that	the	model	affords	is	inadequate,	then	perhaps	there	is	no	Present	
colour	constancy	 in	 this	case	(as	Cohen	would	argue),	or	perhaps	a	
forthcoming	account	of	such	experience	will	fare	better.	I	cannot	adju-
dicate	that	dispute.	However,	I	will	make	one	further	qualification	in	
support	of	my	description.
On	my	description,	when	this	image	induces	a	layered	experience	
of	objects	and	colours,	while	the	nature	of	 the	transparent	colour	 is	
fully	present	in	experience,	the	natures	of	the	opaque	colours	are	only	
partially	present	—	in	particular	their	lightnesses	are.	One	can	specu-
late	as	to	the	determinate	colours	(e. g.,	the	hues	and	saturations)	of	
the	objects	seen	through	the	transparent	colour,	but	in	a	fundamental	
sense	they	are	not	present	 in	experience,	only	 their	 lightnesses	are.	
It	is	important	to	recognize	that	no	attribution	of	error	is	needed	to	
understand	 this	 kind	 of	 experience.	 Here	 are	 two	means	 of	 insert-
ing	 error.	One	might	deny	 that	 one	 can	have	 a	 layered	 experience	
when	viewing	 this	 image,	 in	which	 case	 the	 surfaces	 seen	 through	
the	 glass	 are	 all	 experienced	 as	 having	 varying	 shades	 of	 blue.	 Re-
flectance	physicalists	would	be	inclined	to	attribute	error	to	such	an	
experience,	for	the	objects	in	the	lot	presumably	are	not	all	blue;	co-
lour	relationalists	need	not	attribute	error	here,	for	the	colours	of	the	
objects	 in	 the	 lot	 can	be	 relative	 to	 factors	 like	 context	 of	 viewing.	
Secondly,	one	might	accept	that	one	can	have	a	 layered	experience	
when	viewing	this	image,	but	suppose	that	we	are	experiencing	the	
surfaces	seen	through	the	glass	to	only	have	varying	shades	of	grey.	
Here	error	would	arguably	be	present	for	an	objectivist,	 for	at	 least	
some	of	these	objects	are	likely	not	grey.
Alternatively,	we	can	ascribe	no	error.	Suppose	that	during	a	lay-
ered	 experience	 we	 are	 only	 experiencing	 the	 lightness	 values	 of	
these	opaque	colours,	and	simply	not	experiencing	their	hues	or	satu-
rations.	Perhaps	our	vision	systems	are	attributing	a	constant	colour	c 
to	the	glass,	various	lightness	values	to	the	objects	seen	through	the	
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simultaneously	along	a	line	of	sight,	and	this	is	achieved	because	the	
former	is	transparent,	the	latter	opaque,	and	the	latter	is	seen	through	
the	former.	Thus	it	is	not	implausible	to	hold	that	Complete	layered	
instances	of	colour	constancy	exist.
Fusion	experiences	would	 involve	the	subject	experiencing	a	sin-
gle	colour	along	a	line	of	sight	that	fuses	together	the	illumination	and	
surface	contributions	to	the	colour	signal.	This	would	typically	mark	
an	instance	of	constancy	failure	in	computational	psychology,	and	do	
so	 in	 the	 Layering	 account	 also.	 It	 is	 well-known	 that	without	 ade-
quate	cues	subjects	are	unable	to	make	the	distinction	between	illumi-
nant	and	surface	contributions	to	experience,	but	instead	experience	a	
conflation	of	the	two	(e. g.,	aperture	colour	experiences	arguably	rou-
tinely	prompt	this).	Thus,	Fusion	experiences	that	involve	illuminants	
instead	of	filters	plausibly	exist.
Regarding	 Incomplete	 layered	 experiences,	 candidate	 stimuli	
that	 can	 generate	 experiences	 containing	 full	 transparent	 and	 par-
tial	opaque	colours,	and	partial	 transparent	and	 full	opaque	colours,	
are	avilable.	Regarding	the	former,	consider	an	illumination	scenario	
analogous	to	the	Glass-Parking	lot	image	(see	Image	4),	where	on	my	
analysis	the	full	colour	of	the	illuminant	is	experienced	but	only	the	
lightnesses	of	 the	surfaces	are.	Regarding	 the	 latter,	and	by	analogy	
with	various	sunglass	cases,	the	full	colour	of	a	 lightly	saturated	red	
light	that	 is	 illuminating	all	 the	objects	in	one’s	field	of	view	will	be	
difficult	to	experience,	particularly	after	a	few	seconds,	yet	the	full	sur-
face	colours	of	objects	in	the	scene	may	nonetheless	be	experienced.	
Thus	the	layering	analysis	can	again	be	used,	including	the	analysis	of	
experiences	of	partial	colours	that	it	affords.36
36.	 In	 theory	 scenarios	can	also	have	multiple	colour	 layers,	e. g.,	 two	filter	 co-
lours	and	one	surface,	one	filter	one	illuminant,	and	one	surface,	etc.	Note	
that	subjects’	ability	to	accurately	describe	their	experiences	may	be	limited	
without	adequate	training	and	instructional	prompts.
§4.4 Extension to Illumination
Some	 readers	may	worry	 that	while	 the	Layering	approach	 is	 intui-
tive	for	Filter	cases,	its	application	to	Illumination	cases	is	unintuitive	
and	potentially	problematic.	A	layering	analysis	of	Illumination	cases	
entails	 that:	 experienced	 illuminants	 and	 (non-filter)	 surfaces	 are	
colour	bearers34;	 these	 illuminants	are	transparent,	and	surfaces	are	
opaque;	we	experience	 these	 illuminants	by	 looking	 through	 them	
to	these	surfaces,	and	experience	these	surfaces	by	looking	at	them	
through	 these	 illuminants.	 Present	 colour	 constancy	 obtains	 when	
one	of	these	remains	constant;	the	other	varies,	and	precisely	that	is	
experienced.	While	this	application	is	logically	straightforward,	there	
are	reasons	for	concern.	Before	considering	objections,	 let	me	moti-
vate	the	full	account.	
§4.4.1
Applying	the	division	between	Complete	layered,	Incomplete	layered,	
and	Fusion	experiences	 to	 Illumination	 cases	 is	 logically	 straightfor-
ward.	Finding	cases	 that	potentially	 instantiate	each	 is	also	not	diffi-
cult.35	Scenarios	in	which	subjects	are	able	to	describe	the	colour	of	the	
illuminant	and	the	colours	of	surfaces	exist	(e. g.,	that’s	a	black	phone	
under	a	yellow	light)	and	are	evidence	for	the	presence	of	multiple	co-
lours	along	a	line	of	sight.	This	must	be	explained	in	some	way.	Cohen	
would	argue	that	one	colour	(a	blackish-yellow)	is	occurrent,	and	any	
expression	of	a	black	simpliciter,	or	a	yellow	simpliciter,	is	an	expres-
sion	of	a	counterfactual	content.	An	experientially	realistic	account	in	
which	a	constant	colour	is	before	us	in	experience	(or	occurrent)	must	
appeal	to	alternative	resources.	A	layering	analysis	is	at	least	credible	
if	not	satisfying:	 the	 illuminant	and	surface	colours	are	experienced	
34.	Or,	 for	 the	 subjectivist,	 causes	 of,	 or	 erroneously	 represented	 as,	 colour	
bearers.
35.	 Recall	 the	 additional	 category,	 Complete	 Occlusion,	 where	 the	 proximate	
layer	completely	occludes	the	distal	one.	Extremely	bright	lights	achieve	this,	
e. g.,	a	bright	white	light,	particularly	when	one’s	eyes	are	dark-adapted,	com-
pletely	occludes	distal	surfaces,	at	least	for	a	time.	Here	the	light	is	momen-
tarily	functioning	as	an	opaque	entity	as	opposed	to	a	transparent	one.
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A	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 these	 and	 other	 concerns	would	 require	 a	
work	of	considerable	length.	Let	me	therefore	only	briefly	remark	on	
how	they	can	be	addressed,	and	then	turn	to	contrasting	the	Layering	
account	with	some	recent	alternatives.
As	 discussed	 in	 §1,	 the	 idea	 that	 Illumination	 variations	 merely	
“reach	the	eye”	is	no	longer	a	live	option	in	discussions	of	colour	con-
stancy.	At	 least	 some	 of	 the	 illumination	 variations	 relevant	 to	 con-
stancy	 are	 typically	 experienced,	 hence	 we	 all	 must	 offer	 accounts	
of	constancy	experience	that	capture	this.	This	makes	worries	like	2.	
have	little	force,	for	all	must	address	the	difficult	question	of	which	oc-
current	photons	are	being	experienced.	What	the	Layering	approach	
adds	to	this	is	the	claim	that	the	experienced	photons	are	experienced	
in	 a	 particular	 way	—	as	 transparent.37	 Regarding	 3.,	 experienced	 il-
luminants	can	be	thin	sheets	(e. g.,	flat	shadows)	or	thicker	volumes	
(e. g.,	 volume	shadows),	depending	on	 the	 case.	What	defines	 these	
boundaries	may	be	taken	to	be	the	extent	of	what	we	experience,	or	
something	more	objective	if	available.	Either	way,	this	may	be	difficult	
to	assess,	and	inherently	vague,	but	all	accounts	of	constancy	will	be	
subject	to	these	problems	(lest	they,	e. g.,	deny	the	existence	of	volume	
shadows).	Here	is	one	of	several	possible	responses	to	4.:	experienced	
illumination	variations	involving	white	light	typically	involve	incom-
plete	layered	experiences,	where	the	lightnesses,	but	not	the	hues	or	
saturations,	of	the	transparent	colours	are	experienced,	and	the	com-
plete	colours	of	distal	surfaces	are	experienced.
37.	 As	long	as	by	“transparent”	we	mean	“can	see	through”	there	is	no	conceptual	
difficulty	with	 this	 idea	 (see	opening	 section).	 If	one	wishes	 to	extend	 the	
meaning	of	“transparent”	to	“transmits	light	in	appropriate	ways”	some	tech-
nicalities	may	arise.	However,	they	are	not	obviously	insurmountable.	Con-
sider	a	thin	shadow	on	a	wall.	If	we	identify	the	shadow	with	some	portion	of	
the	incident	light,	say,	a	thin	film	of	photons	about	to	strike	the	wall	(a	class	
whose	members	are	constantly	changing),	then	my	account	would	deem	that	
thin	film	of	photons	to	be	“transparent”.	The	light	reflected	from	the	wall	to	
the	perceiver	travels	through	the	region	of	space	occupied	by	the	thin	film	
of	photons.	In	this	sense	the	thin	film	of	photons	transmits	the	reflected	light,	
and	hence	satisfies	even	the	transmission	sense	of	“transparent”.
§4.4.2 Objections
Here	are	some	(of	many)	general	objections	to	a	Layering	interpreta-
tion	of	Illuminant	cases:
1.	We	have	not	been	 thinking	of	 Illumination	constancy	cases	
as	layered,	and	we’ve	been	thinking	about	them	for	some	
time.	Similarly,	we	have	been	aware	of	 layered	colour	ex-
periences	for	some	time	(e. g.,	by	looking	at	books	through	
beer),	and	Illuminant	cases	do	not	seem	like	this.
2.	Which	of	 the	occurrent	photons	 are	being	 seen	 through	 to	
surfaces;	which	are	not?
3.	Where	is	the	transparent	illuminant	experienced	as	being?
4.	If	light	is	coloured,	then	daylight	is	a	(yellowish-)white	light.	
We	generally	do	not	experience	the	daylit	world	as	though	
we	are	looking	through	a	white	transparent	colour.	Hence	
the	Layering	account	makes	an	incorrect	prediction.
Image	4,	Audience	through	green	light.	Performa,	2009.	Photo	by	
Paula	Court.
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how,	in	“traditional…paradigms,	it	can	often	be	difficult	to	determine	
whether	scission	 is	occurring”	and	are	actively	developing	new	para-
digms	to	minimize	the	problem	(Anderson	2008,	241).	
I	suggest	that	some	layered	experiences	will	be	obviously	such	to	
perceivers,	but	some	other	layered	experiences	may	not	be	obviously	
such	 to	perceivers,	where	what	 is	 “obvious”	 can	vary	depending	on	
factors	 like	 background	knowledge,	 training,	 priming,	 and	 so	 on.	A	
Layering	approach	to	Illumination	cases	would	place	many	standard	
constancy	cases	 in	 the	realm	of	 layered	experiences	 that	are	not	ob-
viously	such	for	most	people.	 I	see	no	reason	why	this	would	count	
against	its	tenability.
If	a	layered	experience	is	not	obviously	a	layered	experience	to	the	
perceiver	then	it	will	be	difficult	to	assess	that	this	is	obtaining,	as	op-
posed	to	the	perceiver	having	a	non-layered	experience.	Psychophysi-
cists	will	naturally	have	much	to	add	to	this	discussion.	However,	their	
efforts	hinge	on	an	adequate	model	for	predicting	when	experiences	
of	layering	occur,	and	they	are	by	their	own	admission	currently	strug-
gling	to	construct	a	general,	unified	theory	that	predicts	when	an	obvi-
ously	layered	experience	will	occur	for	subjects.	Such	a	theory	may	but 
need not	generalize	to	cases	when	layered	experiences	occur	but	are	
not	obvious	to	subjects.	In	any	case,	a	theory	of	the	latter	sort	is	what	
would	be	needed	 to	 test	 a	 Layering	 approach	 to	 Illumination	 cases.	
Thus,	I	submit	that	while	1.	is	a	legitimate	concern,	at this stage in our 
collective understanding	it	does	not	significantly	detract	from	the	worth	
of	the	current	proposal.	These	general	remarks	can	be	buttressed	by	
a	concrete	counterexample	and	then	a	remark	on	how	the	Layering	
analysis	connects	to	some	empirical	literature.	
Casati	 (2009)	 rejects	 the	general	 transparency	of	 shadows	but	 is	
not	 concerned	 specifically	 with	 colour	 constancy.	 Here	 is	 the	 core	
argument:
(1) “[S]hadows can be seen as shadows even though they do not 
straddle a luminance boundary.”
1.	 is	 a	 general	 objection	 and	hence	demands	 slightly	more	 atten-
tion.	I	accept	that	my	proposal	is	a	significant	reorientation	from	most	
but	not	all	existing	views.38	However,	that	this	analysis	has	eluded	us	
should	not	be	a	surprise;	colour	constancy	has	been	an	extremely	dif-
ficult	topic	for	scientists	for	some	time39,	and	not	actively	studied	by	
philosophers	 until	 recently.	 In	 psychology,	 for	 example,	 layered	 vi-
sual	 experiences	—	scissions	—	have	 been	 of	 particular	 interest	 since	
the	1970s.40	Here	the	focus	is	often	on	perceptual	cues	that	are	likely	
to	prompt	subjects	 to	experience	a	 transparent	 (or	 translucent)	film	
before	an	opaque	surface.	The	stimulus	might	 for	example	be	a	flat,	
single-layered	surface,	and	thus	when	an	experience	of	layering	is	in-
duced	the	experience	might	be	deemed	“illusory”.41 
With	regard	to	1.,	a	key	issue	is	whether	or	not	layered	experienc-
es	must	 be	 straightforwardly	 introspectively	 accessible	 as	 such	 (e. g.,	
whether	or	not	 experiences	 expressing	 layered	 contents	 are	 straight-
forwardly	introspectively	accessible	as	such).	If	yes	then	the	fact	that	
Illumination	cases	have	not	been	theorized	as	layered	counts	against	
the	current	proposal,	but	if	not	then	this	fact	has	little	negative	impact	
on	the	current	proposal.	Scientists	working	on	scissions	are	naturally	
often	interested	in	scenarios	where	it	is	obvious	to	the	subject	that	lay-
ering	is	experienced,	so	that	these	scientists	can	safely	assume	that	they	
are	studying	experiences	of	 layering.	But	scientists	are	also	aware	of	
38.	The	proposed	view	is	somewhat	similar	to	that	of	Mausfeld	(2003)	and	Web-
ster	(2009)	but	differs	under	fine-grained	analysis.	The	relationship	between	
colour	constancy	and	experiences	of	layering	has	received	some	recent	inter-
est	(e. g.,	Khang	&	Zaidi	2002a,b).	See	also	§5.	
39.	For	example,	in	Colour for Philosophers Hardin	calls	colour	constancy	“far	from	
properly	explained”,	and	doesn’t	propose	to	resolve	the	matter	(1988,	82).	See	
again	Shevell	&	Kingdom	(2008)	for	a	recent	review.
40.	Metelli	 (1974)	 is	a	classic	work.	Anderson	 (2008)	offers	an	alternative	and	
summarizes	some	seemingly	fatal	problems	for	Metelli’s	view	and	the	views	
based	on	it.	Kingdom	(2011)	is	an	excellent	review	article.
41.	 Khang	&	Zaidi	(2002a,b)	are	notable	exceptions.	They	used	computer	sim-
ulations	of	actual	 layered	stimuli,	allowing	them	to	test	 for	the	accuracy	of	
subject	(behavioural)	reports	of	layering	with	regard	to	the	stimuli.	Whether	
or	not,	on	a	deeper	level,	these	perceptions	might	be	considered	“illusory”	I	
cannot	pause	to	consider.
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philosophical	nature	of	this	work,	I	will	settle	for	the	plausible	consis-
tency	 of	 the	 Layering	 account	with	 some	key	 empirical	 results,	 not-
ing	that	the	experiments	from	this	literature	were	not	designed	with	
a	Layering	hypothesis	 in	mind.43	Suppose	that	 the	Layering	analysis	
is	correct	of	a	significant	number	of	constancy	cases,	and	hence	that	
experiences	of	layering	in	those	cases	are	not	obviously	such	to	aver-
age	perceivers.	In	tests	for	this	we	would	expect	instructional	effects,	
since	subjects’	descriptions	of,	or	behaviours	with	regard	to,	what	they	
are	experiencing	could	likely	be	pulled	toward	or	away	from	the	lay-
ered	aspect	of	what	they	experience	or	from	one	of	the	layers	toward	
the	other.	We	find	significant	instructional	effects	in	the	empirical	lit-
erature	on	colour	constancy	(see,	e. g.,	Arend	&	Reeves	1986,	and	Ar-
end	1993).	Given	layering	during	constancy	we	would	expect	there	to	
be	persistent	residual	evidence	of	the	distinctness	of	the	transparent	
and	opaque	layers.	For	example,	aspects	of	the	illuminant	and	surface	
contributions	to	colour	experience	should	resist	reduction	to	one	an-
other,	and	they	at	times	do	(e. g.,	Logvinenko	&	Maloney	2006).	Given	
layering	during	constancy	we	would	expect	that	a	perceptual	match	
between	two	adjacent	layered	elements	requires	matching	two	layers	
of	colour	information,	and	that	a	perceptual	match	between	a	layered	
stimulus	and	a	nonlayered	one	would	be	impossible,	yielding	at	best	
partial	matches.	Further,	if	subjects	are	not	given	the	capacity	to	ma-
nipulate	both	layers	when	searching	for	a	match	(e. g.,	in	asymmetric	
matching	tasks),	then	in	general	we	should	expect	precisely	what	we	
find,	namely	 that	approximate	matches	are	all	 that	 is	achievable	 for	
standard	stimuli.	
The	Layering	analysis	can	thus	be	used	to	generate	an	interpreta-
tion	of	notable	aspects	of	the	empirical	data	on	colour	constancy.	To	
empirically	test	it	we	have	to	construct	paradigms	designed	to	bring	
out	the	extent	to	which	postulating	two	(full	or	partial)	colours	along	
a	line	of	sight	is	helpful	in	predicting	and	explaining	subject	respons-
es.	I	know	of	none	that	attempts	this.	The	Layering	analysis	therefore	
43.	 As	mentioned	above,	a	notable	exception	is	Khang	&	Zaidi	(2002a,b).
(2) “[B]ut straddling a boundary is [required42] for a transparent 
surface to be perceived.”
(3) “Hence the general case of shadows’ being transparent is not 
viable.” [2009, 9]
Three	remarks	are	relevant.	Firstly,	a	Layering	approach	to	Illumination	
cases	also	rejects	the	general	transparency	of	shadows	(in	agreement	
with	(3)),	in	particular	in	fusion	cases.	The	issue	is	whether	or	not	shad-
ow	cases	involving	constancy	can	also	be	non-fusion,	and	if	so	whether	
or	not	 labeling	the	shadow	‘transparent’	 is	appropriate.	Casati’s	argu-
ment	says	nothing	about	the	matter	and	in	this	regard	it	is	tangential	to	
our	discussion.	Secondly,	while	(1)	seems	correct,	much	hangs	on	how	
“seen	as”	is	to	be	interpreted,	and	Casati	gives	no	guidance	on	how	to	
interpret	this	notoriously	thorny	phrase.	Thus	the	significance	of	(1)	for	
our	discussion	 is	difficult	 to	assess.	Finally,	 (2)	 is	a	 theoretical	postu-
late	which	Casati	defends	by	appeal	to	two	psychological	accounts	of	
transparent	perception	(Metelli	1974	and	Kitaoka	2005).	Although	the	
details	of	these	accounts	are	interesting,	space	prevents	a	thorough	dis-
cussion	of	them.	For	our	purposes	it	is	adequate	to	recognize	that:	(a)	
there	isn’t	unanimous	agreement	about	what	triggers	transparency	ex-
periences	in	the	psychological	literature	(see	above);	(b)	psychological	
accounts	are	typically	not	taken	to	be	fully	general,	contrary	to	what	is	
implied	by	Casati;	and	(c)	psychological	accounts	are	typically	focused	
on	finding	cues	for	when	it	is	straightforwardly	introspectively	obvious	
to	subjects	that	they	are	undergoing	a	transparency	experience,	which	
is	a	constraint	that	we	would	have	to	move	beyond	to	assess	a	Layering	
approach	 to	 Illumination	 cases.	Thus	 although	Casati’s	 discussion	 is	
interesting	and	informative,	it	and	others	like	it	should	not	cause	us	to	
recoil	from	the	Layering	account.
The	empirical	literature	on	colour	constancy	is	vast,	and	as	noted	
at	the	outset	the	phenomenon	itself	is	in	some	cases	differently	con-
ceived	by	different	scientists	(see	again	Chirimuuta	2008).	Given	the	
42.	 Instead	of	‘required’	the	text	states	‘requested’.	I	presume	it	is	a	typographical	
error.
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can	in	theory	readily	apply	to	seemingly	all	Illumination	cases	(includ-
ing	all	shadow	cases)	and	Filter	cases.
The	point	is	not	that	all	constancy	reports	are	indicative	of	Layered	
constancy	 experiences	—	some	may	well	 be	 indicative	of	 counterfac-
tual	constancy	contents.	 It	 is	 that	Layered	cases	plausibly	exist,	and	
our	 task	 looking	 forward	 is	 to	determine	 their	 extent	while	 striving	
to	satisfy,	as	much	as	is	reasonable,	our	five	constraints.	Let	us	finally	
consider	some	alternative	accounts	in	detail.
§5 Alternative views
I	have	emphasized	the	difference	between	the	layering	and	counter-
factual	accounts	of	constancy,	and	the	fact	that	the	former	is	consistent	
with	various	colour	ontologies	and	epistemologies,	in	particular	with	
both	colour	subjectivism	and	objectivism.	This	being	said,	there	is	no	
doubt	that	constancy	is	of	most	interest	to	colour	objectivists.	I	take	
what	has	preceded	to	undermine	any	straightforward	argument	from	
constancy	to	objectivism.	It	is,	nonetheless,	worth	seeing	how	the	Lay-
ering	account	fares	against	two	objectivist	accounts,	for	in	my	judge-
ment	it	fares	rather	well.	I	have	elected	to	focus	on	two	recent	and	ex-
cellent	contributions:	David	Hilbert	(2005)	and	Joshua	Gert	(2010).44 
There	is	now	general	agreement	that,	 in	contrast	to	some	earlier	
accounts	(see	§1,	 references	 in	note	7,	and	below),	 illuminant	varia-
tions	are	not	 simply	 “discounted”	by	 the	vision	 system,	but	 instead	
are	 regularly	 experienced	by	us.	 Both	 the	proposals	 of	Hilbert	 and	
Gert	make	this	accommodation	while	maintaining	a	form	of	objectiv-
ism,	but	neither	have	homed	in	on	the	fact	that	the	problem	is	more	
general	 than	 this.	 The	 challenge	 for	 objectivists	 isn’t	merely	 to	 ac-
commodate	experienced	illumination	variations	into	our	account	of	
colour	constancy,	it	is	to	at	minimum satisfy	(1),(2),(4)&(5)	from	the	
last	section.	(3),	the	commitment	to	theoretical	permissiveness,	is	to	
44.	 In	addition	to	articles	discussed	earlier,	recent	writings	in	which	colour	con-
stancy	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 include	 Burge	 (2010),	 Gert	 (2010),	 Hilbert	
(2005),	Jagnow	(2010),	Kalderon	(2008),	Matthen	(2010),	Maund	(2012),	Noë	
(2004),	Smith	(2002).	I	am	forced	to	select	from	this	impressive	list	of	works	
but	a	few	on	which	to	focus.
cannot	be	quickly	dismissed	by	any	claim,	such	as	1.,	to	the	effect	that	
that	analysis	should	have	emerged	as	a	plausible	contender	by	now.	
Rather	than	pursue	objections	further	let	me	summarize	the	section	
and	proceed	to	contrast	this	account	of	constancy	with	two	of	its	rivals.	
§4.5 Summary & Explanatory power. 
The	division	between	Complete	layered,	Incomplete	layered,	and	Fu-
sion	experiences	is	not	merely	predictable	within	a	Layering	approach	
to	constancy,	it	finds	support	in	specific	Filter	and	Illumination	cases	
that	 are	 otherwise	 difficult	 to	 explain.	 Beyond	 this	 the	 division	 can	
be	incorporated	into	different	colour	ontologies	and	epistemologies	in	
various	ways	(the	details	of	which	I	leave	for	another	work),	and	the	
division	greatly	increases	the	power	of	the	Layering	account.	Let	me	
remark	on	the	last	point.
The	recognition	of	 two	 forms	of	 layered	experiences	—	Complete	
and	 Incomplete	—	considerably	 increases	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	
the	account.	Cases	where	the	filter/illuminant	colour	and	surface	co-
lour	are	distinctly	discernible	suggest	Complete	layering.	Cases	where	
one	 can	 discern	 a	 filter/illumination	 variation	 across	 some	 opaque	
surface,	but	not	fully	discern	the	filter/illumination	colour,	or	vice	ver-
sa,	suggest	Incomplete	layering.	The	crucial	achievement	is	that	in	all	
such	cases	there	is	no	need	to	attribute	the	filter/illuminant	contribu-
tions	to	what	is	experienced	to the opaque surface.	If	one	can	distinguish	
a	filter/illuminant	contribution	to	colour	experience	 from an	opaque	
surface	contribution,	one	can	attribute	the	former	to	the	filter/illumi-
nant	and	the	latter	to	the	surface,	full	stop.	This	is	so	even	if	one	cannot	
discern	a	complete	colour	for	one	or	the	other.	This	permits	us	to	hold	
that	one	has	differing	perspectives	on	the	constant	colour	without	vio-
lating	Russell’s	Sentiment:	the	target	(surface	or	filter/illuminant)	co-
lour	is	experientially	constant	despite	an	experienced	colour	variation,	
where	the	variation	is	not explained	as	involving	a	changed	aspect	of	
the	target	colour	but	is	instead	explained	by	reference	to	a	distinct	co-
lour	one	also	experiences	along	the	same	line	of	sight.	We	thus	have	a	
general	model	that	meets	the	five	constraints	outlined	above,	and	that	
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the	extra	dimension(s)	are	and	how	 they	are	 related	 to	 represented	
colour	proper,	making	his	solution	difficult	to	assess.	I	therefore	must	
make	what	I	hope	are	judicious	interpretive	decisions.	As	I	(and	Gert,	
2010,	673–6)	read	Hilbert	his	idea	is	that	the	vision	system	represents	
colours	 to	be	 the	kind	of	 thing	 that	can	be	variously	 illuminated,	 in	
which	case	the	extra	dimension	is	“illumination	of	colour	x”,	where	x is	
still	uniquely	specifiable	in	a	suitable	HSL	space.
Note	 that	 the	claim	that	 the	 light	 illuminating	an	object	must	be	
represented	as	a	“property	of	the	object”	as	opposed	to	“a	property	of	
the	light	source”	is	a	false	dichotomy	that	excludes	by	fiat	the	option	
defended	here,	namely	that	the	illuminant	is	represented	as	what	it	is:	
its	own	ontological	entity.47	This	forced-choice	makes	Hilbert’s	claim	
that	the	illumination	is	represented	as	a	property	of	the	object	seem	
more	natural	than	it	is,	and	plays	nicely	into	his	overall	solution,	which	
is	designed	 to	preserve	 reflectance	physicalism.	On	 this	 solution	co-
lours	are still classes	of	reflectances/productances,	located	in	an	HSL	
space.	The	perceptual	 variabilities	 in	 constancy	 cases	do	not	 under-
mine	this,	but	 instead	force	us	to	recognize	that	when	we	represent	
colours	we	do	not	solely	represent	them,	but	instead	represent	them	
to	be	 illuminated	in	some	way.	Crucially,	 these	 illuminations	do	not	
alter	colours	themselves,	only	the	way	colours	are	presented	to	us	in	a	
given	circumstance.	Thus	the	idea	that	illuminants	are	coloured	is	still	
excluded	from	Hilbert’s	account.	
On	my	 reading	 this	account	has	 the	advantage	of	 fundamentally	
incorporating	into	colour	perception	and	experience	the	idea	that	we	
can	and	always	do	have	a	particular	perspective	on	a	colour	—	colours	
are	never	(or	rarely)	experienced	simpliciter,	but	are	instead	only	expe-
rienced	as	illuminated	in	some	way.	In	this	regard	Hilbert	has	made	a	
47.	 We	certainly	conceive	of	the	world	as	working	this	way,	namely	as	the	physi-
cal	substance	light	being	what	illuminates	and	thereby	makes	visible	to	us	the	
ontologically	distinct	hats	and	horses	in	scenes.	There	are	no	doubt	interest-
ing	and	only	partially	understood	 issues	 in	physics	concerning	how	 illumi-
nants	and	hats	 interact,	but	we	nonetheless	accept	 the	occurrence	of	 such	
interactions	and	feel	no	pressure	to	collapse	illumination	into	a	property	of	
hats	(or	horses).	
my	mind	preferable	but	can	be	momentarily	set	aside,	given	the	ob-
jectivist	interests	of	our	targets.
§5.1 The Minimalist solution (illumination variation as brightness variation).
We	can	view	Hilbert	 (2005)	as	 trying	 to	 solve	 the	VC	Challenge	by	
making	the	smallest	possible	deviation	from	older	“discount	the	illu-
minant”	views.45	On	his	approach	“colour	appearance”	is	represented	
colour,	colour	as	it	is	represented	by	some	perceiver	in	some	circum-
stance.	It	need	not	constitute	actual	colour.	He	begins	by	claiming	that	
“in	addition	to	delivering	information	about	the	reflecting	properties	
of	objects	the	visual	system	also	delivers	information	about	the	way	
in	which	 those	objects	are	 illuminated”	(p.	150).	We	assume	that	by	
‘delivers’	 he	means	 that	 the	 vision	 system	makes	 illumination	 infor-
mation	available	to	the	agent	for	conscious	perception.	Hilbert	then	
argues	that	this	illumination	must	be	represented	as	a	“property	of	the	
object”	 as	opposed	 to	 “a	property	of	 the	 light	 source”,	 and	 says	 that	
one	“consequence	of	this…is	that	the	colour	appearance	of	an	object	
must	 have	more	 than	 the	 traditional	 three	 dimensions	 of	 variation”	
(pp.	150–151).	The	implied	usual	three	dimensions	are	hue,	saturation	
and	lightness	[HSL].46	He	is	unfortunately	somewhat	vague	on	what	
45.	 Most	readers	will	be	familiar	with	the	reflectance	physicalist	approach	de-
fended	by	Hilbert	alongside	Byrne	(e. g.,	Byrne	&	Hilbert,	1997a,	2003).	On	
this	view	colours	belong	to	surfaces,	films,	volumes,	and	light	sources,	but	
not	to	light	itself	(2003,	11).	E. g.,	the	sun	has	a	colour	but	the	light	it	emits	
does	 not.	 This	 does	 not	 prevent	 us	 from	 representing	 illuminants	 to	 be	
coloured	(1997a,	fn	15;	2003,	54),	it	simply	prevents	those	representations	
from	being	veridical.	
46.	 For	convenience	I	will	presuppose	HSL	as	the	standard	colour	space.	In	gen-
eral	the	reader	may	substitute	this	for	her	preferred	three-dimensional	model.	
Hilbert	makes	no	firm	commitments	on	 the	appropriate	extra-dimensional	
model,	but	mentions	as	a	possibility	Fairchild’s	(1998,	107–9)	account	involv-
ing	brightness,	lightness,	colourfulness,	chroma,	and	hue.	Fairchild’s	model	
is	worth	analyzing	on	its	own	terms,	for	I	believe	it	too	contains	some	of	the	
weaknesses	the	present	account	has	been	designed	to	avoid.	The	same	dan-
gers	no	doubt	hold	of	various	other	models.	Thus	while	I	invite	the	reader	to	
substitute	 for	HSL	her	preferred	 three-dimensional	model,	note	 that	 some	
models,	even	three-dimensional	ones,	may	not	fit	cleanly	into	the	Layering	
Thesis.	Unfortunately,	I	must	leave	these	modeling	troubles	to	another	time.
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needs	explanation	is	how	brightly	or	dimly	lit	a	colour	is,	then	mov-
ing	from	‘x	is	represented	as	blue’	to	‘x	is	represented	as	a	brightly/
dimly	lit	blue’	is	appropriate.	
However,	 this	 analysis	 is	 not	 powerful	 enough	 to	 accommodate	
the	 fact	 that	 the	experienced	variations	 in	 Illumination	 cases	go	 far	
beyond	how	brightly	 and	dimly	 lit	 colours	 are,	 and	 instead	 include	
experienced	variations	in	at	least	hues	(but	perhaps	also	saturations).	
In	red	twilight	 there	 is	no	doubt	 that	 I	experience	redness,	and	that	
this	is	not	explainable	in	terms	of	how	brightly	or	dimly	lit	my	room	
is.	 If	colour	constancy	 is	occurring,	which	 it	can	 in	such	cases,	 then	
we	 are	 obliged	 to	 explain	how	 the	 constant	white	 of	my	wall	 is	 ex-
perienced	with	respect	to	the	redness	I	also	experience	—	we	must	to	
solve	the	VC	Challenge.	What	we	need	is	not	to	increase	the	number	
of	dimensions	of	experienced	colour,	from	three	to	four	or	five,	we	need	
to	increase	the	number	of	experienced colours	from	one	to	two.	While	
this	possibility	is	perhaps	easy	to	overlook	when	focused	on	the	idea	
that	colours	can	be	more	brightly	or	dimly	illuminated,	it	is	impossible	
to	miss	when	focused	on	Filter	cases	and	constancy	scenarios	involv-
ing	chromatic	variations	more	generally.49	Consider	a	final	challenge	
for	Hilbert,	one	targeting	the	inference	from	constancy	to	reflectance	
physicalism.
Recall	 the	 connection	 between	 reflectance	 physicalism	 and	 con-
stancy	 from	§1.	On	 traditional	 “discount	 the	 illuminant”	accounts	of	
49.	 Instead	 of	 the	 dimension	 “more	 or	 less	 brightly	 illuminated”,	 consider	 an	
analogue	dimension	 “more	or	 less	 revealed”,	 constructed	 specifically	 to	be	
conceptually	 distinct	 from	 illumination.	 It	may	 be	 that	 on	 further	 analysis	
admitting	 colour	 layers	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 capture	 some	 aspect	 of	 phenom-
enology	 concerning	 colour	 revelation,	 e. g.,	 that	 a	 transparent	 or	 opaque	
colour	 is	more	or	 less	 revealed	 in	 some	 context.	 In	 this	 case	 the	Layering	
approach	could	be	supplemented	by	some	such	analogue	of	Hilbert’s	 idea.	
However,	firstly,	this	outcome	would	not	affect	any	of	the	arguments	offered	
here	 for	 the	 inadequacy	of	Hilbert’s	proposal	or	 the	strengths	of	 the	Layer-
ing	approach.	At	worst	this	would	show	an	incompleteness	to	the	Layering	
approach	as	presented.	Secondly,	on	a	more	realist	reading	of	the	Layering	
approach,	during	 incomplete	 and	 completely	occlusive	 cases	 (see	§4)	 a	di-
mension	of	the	revelatory	sort	is	already	contained	in	the	account.	As	such,	
any	suggestion	that	an	additional	revelatory	dimension	is	mandated	would	
require	distinct	and	to	this	point	unarticulated	motivation.
core,	Russellian-friendly,	 reorientation	needed	 to	meet	 the	VC	Chal-
lenge.	However,	he	has	not	gone	far	enough:	his	solution	is	not	gen-
eralizable	 to	Filter	 cases,	 and	even	within	 Illuminant	 cases	 it	 seems	
restricted	to	achromatic	illumination	variations.	Let	me	explain.
Hilbert’s	solution	is	not	generalizable	to	Filter	cases	because	the	so-
lution	is	explicitly	defined	by	reference	to	illumination	variations.	He	
may	see	this	as	a	virtue,	perhaps	because	the	computational	approach	
to	 constancy	 that	he	has	advocated	 for	years	 is	 typically	defined	by	
reference	 to	 Illuminant	 cases.48	 It	 is	 fair	 to	demand	more.	There	are	
various	Filter	and	Illuminant	cases	that	are	perceptually	similar,	and	
the	 general	 phenomenon	 of	 colour	 constancy	 is	 operative	 in	 both	
domains.	Thus,	accounts	that	contain	the	generality	to	recover	these	
facts	should	be	preferred,	all	else	being	equal,	to	ones	that	do	not.	The	
point	is	not	to	demand	that	all Filter	and	Illuminant	cases	are	treated	
exactly	the	same	(e. g.,	in	the	beer-book	image	the	transparent	colour	
has	well-defined	depth	boundaries	which	will	be	absent	in	many	Illu-
minant	cases).	The	point	is	that	our	account	should	contain	a	level	of	
generality	that	can	apply	to	both	domains	and	explain	what	they	have	
in	common,	and	then	contain	lower-levels	of	generality	that	bring	out	
any	ineliminable	differences	between	Illuminant	and	Filter	cases	that	
are	discovered,	or	between	particular	cases,	and	so	on.	Hilbert’s	solu-
tion	is	not	robust	enough	to	facilitate	this.	
Furthermore,	 Hilbert’s	 proposal	 to	 increase	 the	 number	 of	 di-
mensions	of	colour	appearance	beyond	the	“traditional	three”	is	too	
limited.	His	focus	is	almost	exclusively	on	shadow	perceptions	and	
more	 generally	 on	 constancies	with	 achromatic	 illumination	 varia-
tions.	 This	 restriction	 supports	 thinking	 of	 the	 variabilities	 in	 con-
stancy	cases	as	mere	variations	in	how	“brightly”	or	“dimly”	a	colour	
is	 illuminated	 (Hilbert,	 2005,	 150).	This	perhaps	 suggests	Hilbert’s	
view,	 that	we	 should	 stick	 to	 a	 single	 represented	 (surface)	 colour	
but	increase	the	number	of	represented	colour	dimensions:	if	what	
48.	Note	 that	 since	 constancy	experiments	began	being	performed	using	 com-
puter	 screens	 the	 potential	 to	 conflate	 Illuminant	 and	 Filter	 cases	 has	 in-
creased	dramatically.	
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the	inference	from	constancy	to	reflectance	physicalism	could,	all	else	
being	equal,	be	broadly	sustained.
It	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 these	 virtues	 hinge	 precisely	 on	 character-
izing	experienced	variations	in	constancy	scenarios	as	primarily	and	
fundamentally	 consisting	 of	 experienced	 variations	 in	 how	 brightly	
or	 dimly	 some	 thing	 is	 illuminated.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 experienced	
variations	in	constancy	scenarios	are	much	broader	than	this:	they	in-
volve	experienced	variations	in	hue	and	thus	colour	proper	(in	both	
Illuminant	and	Filter	cases),	and	at	least	in	principle	need	not	involve	
experienced	variation	in	illumination	(in	Filter	cases).	Thus,	the	above	
means	of	reasserting	the	inference	from	constancy	to	reflectance	phys-
icalism	should	be	rejected.	Here	is	the	broader	narrative.
The	lesson	is	that	experienced	hues	[and	thus	colours	proper]	do	
change	across	variations	 in	at	 least	 some	constancy	cases.	The	chal-
lenge	is	to	incorporate	this	into	our	theory	of	colour	experience	and	
assess	its	impact	on	what	constancy	might	tell	us	about	colour	ontol-
ogy.	Here	are	two	options.	The	first	concedes	that	experienced	hues	
do	 change	 in	 relevant	 cases	 and	 concedes	 that	 there	 is	 no	 experi-
enced	constancy	 in	hues.	Any	account	of	 constancy	based	on	 these	
constraints	will	be	of	an	Absent	sort.	Unfortunately	for	the	objectivist,	
no	Absent	 account	 can	provide	 straightforward	 evidence	 for	 colour	
objectivism;	on	the	contrary	such	accounts	are	grist	for	Russell’s	sub-
jectivist	mill.	In	response	objectivists	can	provide	other	arguments	for	
their	view,	and	undermine	 the	evidence	constancy	provides	against	
their	position.	This	is	not	only	an	odd	position	for	objectivists	to	be	
in,	it	also	demands	a	rather	powerful	argument	to	the	effect	that	all	of	
the	 experienced	variations	 in	 colour	proper	 found	 in	 constancy	 cas-
es	(or	at	least	in	Illuminant	cases)	are	erroneous.	It	is	fair	to	say	that	
B&H	have	not	provided	such	an	argument,	and	I	know	of	no	means	
of	formulating	one	on	their	behalf.	The	other	option	is	to	concede	that	
experienced	hues	do	change	in	relevant	cases	but	resist	 the	 implica-
tion	that	there	is	no	experienced	constancy	in	hues	—	that	is,	to	find	a	
viable	Present	account.	The	Layering	analysis	 is	a	natural	candidate,	
but	we	should	be	cautious	in	assessing	the	impact	on	colour	ontology.	
constancy	it	was	assumed	that	illumination	variations	were	not	widely	
experienced50,	and	to	the	extent	that	they	were,	such	perceptions	were	
deemed	erroneous.	This	analysis	of	colour	constancy	suggests	a	B&H-
style	colour	ontology	according	to	which	surfaces,	films,	volumes,	and	
light	 sources	are	 coloured,	and	 illuminants	are	not.	Constancy	 is	 in-
deed	one	of	 the	chief	 justifications	offered	 for	 their	view,	and	cases	
in	 which	 illumination	 is	 experienced	 are	 deemed	 erroneous.51	 The	
difficulty	is	that	once	“discount	the	illuminant”	accounts	are	rejected	
(on	grounds	that	illumination	variations	are	widely	experienced,	and	
hence	such	experiences	should	not	by	an	objectivist	be	categorized	as	
erroneous),	 the	 support	 constancy	provides	 for	 reflectance	physical-
ism	is	in	doubt.	
Hilbert’s	(2005)	more	recent	proposal	provides	a	way	around	this	
conclusion,	at	least	in	part.	If	illumination	variations	are	widely	expe-
rienced,	but	not	experienced	as	variations	in	colour proper,	then	a	con-
ception	of	constancy	that	captures	this	might	still	support	reflectance	
physicalism.	Hilbert’s	suggestion	that	illumination	enters	into	experi-
ence	not	as	variation	in	colour	proper	but	as	variation	in	how	brightly	
or	dimly	colour	is	illuminated	meets	this	constraint.	On	this	view	ex-
periences	of	illumination	variations	in	general	need	not	be	erroneous	
(for	colours	are	correspondingly	more	brightly	and	dimly	illuminated),	
thus	avoiding	the	problematic	assertion	to	the	contrary	seemingly	pres-
ent	in	B&H’s	earlier	view.	Hence,	were	Hilbert’s	suggestion	adequate,	
50.	Recall	B&H’s	1997c	definition	of	colour	constancy	(§1).
51.	 Here	is	the	relevant	argument	B&H	offer	for	reflectance	physicalism.	When	
searching	 for	 the	physical	property	with	which	 to	 identify	colours,	 “it	 is	of	
course	 the	object	 that	 looks	 colored	 (more	 strictly,	 its	 surface),	 and	so	 the	
relevant	physical	property	must	be	a	property	of	objects	(more	strictly,	sur-
faces)”	(2003,	9).	They	then	claim	that	colour	constancy	supports	their	view,	
for	 given	 constancy,	 and	 “[a]ssuming	 that	 our	 perceptions	 of	 color	 are	 of-
ten	veridical,	we	therefore	need	a	physical	property	of	objects	that	is	largely	
illumination-independent”	 (ibid).	 Light	 in addition to surfaces	 is	 not	 seriously	
considered.	 Instead,	 they	assert	 that	 to	 the	extent	 that	we	represent	 illumi-
nants	as	contributing	to	colour	(1997a,	fn	15;	2003,	54),	those	representations	
are	erroneous.	Also	see	Hilbert	(1992).
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of	surfaces	vary,	and	those	appearances	indicate	or	“pick	out”	what	ob-
jective,	stable	surface	colours	underlie	them.	The	notion	of	a	colour ap-
pearance is	undefined	and	is	used	to	generate	the	possibility	of	having	
different	perspectives	on	a	colour,	for	a	single	colour	gives	rise	to	vari-
ous	colour	appearances	in	various	contexts.53	This	much	is	not	novel,	
but	is	instead	familiar,	at	least	from	early	modern	subjectivist	and	dis-
positionalist	views.	What	is	novel	is	(a)	Gert’s	concession	that	we	can-
not	sustain	the	dispositionalist	idea	that	the	true	colour	of	a	thing	is	
the	one	 that	 is	picked	out	by	 the	colour	appearance	experienced	 in	
normal	conditions,	while	 (b)	 resisting	 the	 threat	of	 colour	subjectiv-
ism.	This	is	achieved	by	divorcing	colours	from	the	HSL	features	that	
seem	 inherent	 in	experienced	variations	 in	 colour	appearances.	 If	 a	
colour	doesn’t	itself	have	a	set	of	HSL	features,	then	it	can	be	“picked	
out”	equally	correctly	by	various	HSL-defined	colour	appearances.	Ex-
actly	how this	is	done	must	be	spelled	out	(and	we	will	not	pursue	the	
matter	here),	but	in	any	case	Gert	has	created	a	conceptual	space	for	
doing	so	that	to	my	mind	is	novel.
A	 brief	 comparison	 with	 Hilbert’s	 view	 is	 instructive.	 Ontologi-
cally,	 both	 agree	 that	 colours	 are	 illumination-independent	 features	
of	 surfaces	 (filters,	 etc.),	 however	whereas	 for	Hilbert	 colours	 have	
HSL	properties,	for	Gert	they	do	not	but	are	instead	merely categorical.	
Experientially,	Hilbert	has	added	dimensions	beyond	HSL	 to	colour	
appearance,	whereas	Gert	has	not.	However,	because	for	Gert	colours	
are	merely	categorical	properties,	he	can	allow	colour	appearances	to	
vary	en masse	without	incurring	the	charge	that	experiences	involving	
53.	 It	is	difficult	to	avoid	quantifying	over	colour	appearances	within	Gert’s	view.	
Thus,	for	ease	of	explication	I	will	implicitly	do	so	in	what	follows.	There	are	
important	questions	concerning	the	ontological	and	epistemic	relations	be-
tween	colours	and	colour	appearances.	E. g.,	are	colour	appearances	caused	
by	 the	 former	 or	 are	 they	 simply	ways	 colours	 present	 themselves	 to	 the	
world?	There	is	an	ontological	simplicity	to	the	latter,	but	given	that	elements	
distinct	 from	a	 surface	colour	 can	affect	 colour	appearances	 (e. g.,	 illumina-
tions,	filters,	natures	of	vision	systems,	etc.)	there	is	at	least	some	pressure	to	
accept	the	former.	I	leave	these	difficulties	in	the	hands	of	this	view’s	defend-
ers.	In	personal	correspondence	Gert	(May	2012)	has	told	me	that	he	is	tempt-
ed	to	interpret	appearances	adverbially,	but	admits	to	not	having	worked	out	
the	details.	
Since	the	Layering	analysis	is	consistent	with	a	host	of	colour	ontolo-
gies	it	is	difficult	to	argue	that	constancy	provides	evidence	in	favour	
of	objectivism.	Further,	the	way	in	which	the	Layering	analysis	is	con-
sistent	with	objectivism	supports	the	existence	of	illuminant	colours,	
and	 thus	stands	 in	 tension	with	anti-illuminant	colour	views	 like	re-
flectance	physicalism.	 I	 therefore	 see	no	 comfortable	 seat	on	which	
B&H	can	rest.
In	summary,	Hilbert	 (2005)	has	 taken	a	crucial	 step,	 for	 the	 idea	
that	we	can	have	different	perspectives	on	colours	is	what	is	needed	
to	solve	the	VC	Challenge	in	an	experientially	realistic	way.	But	what	
is	needed	is	much	broader	than	the	perspectives	afforded	by	“colours	
being	 differently	 illuminated”,	 it	 is	 perspectives	 afforded	by	 looking	
at	one	colour	 through	another.	Hilbert’s	 important	but	 conservative	
deviation	from	“discount	the	illuminant”	approaches	falls	short	of	the	
advance	needed	to	fully	meet	our	challenge.
§5.2 The Appearance solution (separating colours from HSL properties).
Gert	(2010)	has	put	forth	a	conception	of	experienced	colour	that	al-
lows	for	considerable	variation	across	perceptual	contexts	and	none-
theless	keeps	colours	as	constant,	illumination-independent	features	
of	surfaces.	In	his	words:
Colours	 are	 categorical	properties	of	 surfaces,	 and	 they	
are	 picked	 out	 by	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	make	 those	
surfaces	appear	in	different	viewing	conditions.	One	im-
mediate	corollary	of	 this	view	 is	 that	colours	cannot	be	
characterized	 by	 giving	 precise	 coordinates	 in	 HS[L]52 
space	—	nor	 by	 any	 minimal	 extension	 or	 variation	 on	
these	dimensions.	[p.	681]
The	thought	is	that	as	contextual	factors	vary	(e. g.,	illumination,	angle	
of	viewing,	one’s	perceptual	apparatus,	etc.),	the	colour	appearances	
52.	Gert	 prefers	 referring	 to	HSB	 instead	 of	HSL	 space	 (Brightness	 instead	 of	
Lightness).	This	has	no	impact	on	our	discussion,	so	I	will	continue	to	refer	to	
the	latter.
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of	one’s	experience.	That	is,	constant	colours	appear	to	be	at best in-
ferred	from	experience	as	opposed	to	contained	in	it.	There	may	be	
ways	 to	 rectify	 this	problem,	one	of	which	 is	 to	bite	 the	bullet	 and	
reject	 experiential	 realist	demands,	but	 as	 it	 stands	Gert’s	proposal	
avoids	rather	than	solves	the	VC	Challenge	in	an	experientially	realist	
way.	As	such,	conceptual	disengagement	between	him	and	his	Rus-
sellian	counterparts	threatens.
Another	cost	of	Gert’s	view	is	that	colours	are	no	longer	the	prop-
erties	that	intrinsically	have	HSL.	Instead	the	HSL	properties	are	pos-
sessed	by	colour	appearances	(however	these	entities	are	explicated).	
Colours	 are	mere	 categorical properties.	 For	 example,	no	 instance	of	
the	property	BLUE	has	 a	hue,	 saturation,	or	 lightness,	only	blue	ap-
pearances	do.	An	instance	of	BLUE	can	present	itself	to	us	by	giving	
rise	to	a	variety	of	colour	appearances,	depending	on	the	perceptual	
circumstance.	Divorcing	HSL	from	colour	 is	non-trivial.	 It	 is	no	acci-
dent	that	colours	have	been	associated	with	HSL	properties	for	some	
time.	At	 least	on	one	deep-seated	 intuition	we	 take	colours	 to	have	
HSL	properties	 because	when	we	 see,	 reflect	 on,	 talk	 about,	 dream	
about,	paint	with,	and	otherwise	work	with	colours,	we	take	ourselves	
to	be	engaging	with	properties	that	have	(at	least)	HSL	features.	We	
may	be	wrong	about	this,	but	accepting	this	as	an	error	is,	as	I	stated,	
non-trivial,	and	needs	to	be	won	through	a	powerful	argument.
One	could	for	example	imagine	Cohen	welcoming	much	of	Gert’s	
analysis.	Colour	experience	is	highly	variable	in	constancy	scenari-
os,	and	many	of	these	experiences	are	equally	veridical.	Since	there	
is	 no	 constant	 (occurrent)	 colour	 in	 these	 experiences	we	 should,	
says	Cohen,	here	parting	ways	with	Gert,	admit	that	colours	them-
selves	are	variable	in	constancy	scenarios.	What	reason,	Cohen	will	
ask,	 is	there	to	add	that	there	are,	beyond	this,	categorical	colours	
that	are	“picked	out”	by	these	appearances	but	otherwise	not	clearly	
part of	 colour	 experience?	 If	 such	 colours	 are	 spoken	 of	 or	 seem-
ingly	prompted	by	experience	they	are	just	as	easily	accommodated	
by	 postulating	 counterfactual	 contents	 (or	 by	 “coarse-grained”	 co-
lours,	see	Cohen,	2009,	chpt.	4)	as	by	postulating	actual,	categorical	
these	various	appearances	are	largely	erroneous	—	colours	don’t	have	
HSLs,	so	massive	variations	in	HSL	appearances	need	not	fail	to	“pick	
out”	stable	colours.
I	take	it	that	Gert’s	view	can	accommodate	variations	in	colour	ex-
perience	 due	 to	 illumination	 and	 filter	 changes,	 and	 accommodate	
them	in	the	same	way	when	necessary:	they	induce	changes	in	colour	
appearances	but	not	in	colours.	Constraints	(1)&(2)	are	thus	plausibly	
met.	The	account	also	delivers	an	interpretation	of	colour	constancy:	
the	same	colour	can	be	 “picked	out”	by	various	HSL-imbued	colour	
appearances,	and	thus	a	wall’s	colour	is	constant	across	illumination	
variations	 and	 variations	 in	 colour	 appearance.	However,	 this	 inter-
pretation	of	constancy	is	not	an	experientially	realist	one.	
If	 colour	 experience	 is	described	by	 reference	 to	 colour	 appear-
ances,	 and	 those	 appearances	 are	 variable	 in	 Filter	 and	 Illuminant	
constancy	cases,	 then	where	 is	 the	constant	 colour	 in	one’s	experi-
ence?	 The	 constant	 colour	 is	 still	 in the world,	 for	 it	 is	 partially	 re-
sponsible	 for	 and	 is	 “picked	out”	 by	 its	 appearances.	 But	Gert	 has	
not	put	 forth	an	account	of	colour	experience	 that	 forces	us	 to	hold	
that	 the	constant	colour	 is	experienced	 in	addition	 to	 these	colour	
appearance	variations.	The	contrast	with	Hilbert’s	view	brings	 this	
out	particularly	well.	
Hilbert	wants	constant	colours	to	be	constituents	of	constancy	ex-
perience,	hence	his	attempt	 to	accommodate	 the	experienced	varia-
tions	in	constancy	scenarios	in	terms	of	a	colour	being	differently	il-
luminated.	On	this	view	one	can	hold	that	in	Illuminant	cases	the	sub-
ject’s	experience	 is	constituted	by	 the	same	colour,	despite	 it	being	
differently	 illuminated	 and	 experienced	 as	 such	—	what	 is	 dropped	
is	adherence	 to	 the	 traditional	 three	dimensions	of	colour.	Such	an	
experientially	 realist	 account	 is	 seemingly	 unavailable	 to	Gert.	 On	
Gert’s	view	in	an	Illuminant	case	we	experience	changing	colour	ap-
pearances,	a	varied	flux	of	HSL	properties,	and	each	of	these	“picks	
out”	 the	 same	 categorical	 colour.	However,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	
colour	appearances	 to	ensure	 that	 the	purported	 fact	 that	 the	same	
colour	is	picked	out	by	these	various	colour	appearances	is	itself	part	
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§6 Conclusion
On	the	present	view	the	fundamental	philosophical	challenge	colour	
constancy	 poses	 is	 one	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 colour	 experience.	
My	proposed	adjustment	is	the	application	of	a	suitable	notion	of	ex-
perienced	colour	layering	to	constancy	scenarios,	an	application	that	I	
have	admittedly	only	sketched.	Beyond	this,	colour	constancy	and	per-
ceptual	constancies	more	widely	may	be	used	to	bolster	other	theses	
such	as	direct	realism	or	colour	objectivism.54	The	account	of	colour	
constancy	on	offer	 suggests	 that	 these	 arguments	will	 not	 likely	 be	
compelling.	For	example,	a	conception	of	experienced	colour	layering	
is	as	easily	formulable	within	a	sense-datum	theory	(indirect	realism)	
that	asserts	 that	colours	belong	to	sense-data	(subjectivism),	as	 it	 is	
within	 a	direct	 realist	 colour	objectivism.	 I	 regard	 this	 as	 a	 positive	
development.	 All philosophical	 theories	 of	 colour	 perception	 must	
explain	the	nature	of	constancy	experience,	and	the	flexibility	in	this	
account	permits	its	use	for	these	ends.	How	the	account	should	be	de-
veloped	when	situated	within	differing	epistemologies	and	ontologies	
may	be	a	subtle	matter,	but	that	it	can	be	situated	within	a	wide	array	
of	views	is	not	in	doubt.
Since	colour	objectivists	have	had	a	particular	interest	in	constan-
cy,	I	examined	how	objectivists	should	frame	their	view	in	response	
specifically	to	it.	The	discussion	is	important	because	early	accounts	
of	 constancy	 supposed	 that	 only	 illumination	 variations	 were	 rele-
vant	(not	filter	variations),	and	that	we	could	characterize	constancy	
by	reference	to	an	ideal	case	in	which	those	variations	were	not	per-
ceived.	This	 relegated	 the	variable	element	 in	constancy	experience	
to	 instances	 of	 experienced	 illumination	 variations,	 and	 relegated	
those	instances	to	forms	of	perceptual	error.	These	suppositions	are	
no	longer	tenable,	and	the	impact	on	objectivist	accounts	of	constancy	
is	non-trivial.	If	we	add	to	this	that	objectivists	typically	seek	Present	
or	 experientially	 realist	 accounts	—	roughly,	 accounts	 in	 which	 con-
stant	colours	are	present	in	experience	as	opposed	to	arising	in	(sub)
54.	 See	references	in	note	2	for	examples.
colours.	Without	an	experientially	realist	account	of	colour	constan-
cy,	objectivists	face	the	prospect	of	having	an	experientially	unmo-
tivated	ontology.
By	way	of	summary,	consider	the	tension	that	leads	to	Gert’s	excis-
ing	HSL	properties	 from	colour,	 and	how	 that	 tension	 is	 resolvable	
without	such	a	drastic	proposal.	The	tension	is	between:	(a)	surfaces	
have	constant	HSL	colours,	and	(b)	the	relativities	in	constancy	scenar-
ios	involve	variations	in	HSL.	B&H	resolve	this	tension	by	reinterpret-
ing	(b)	and	claiming	that	when	the	relativities	in	constancy	scenarios	
involve	HSL	variations,	those	variations	are	represented	but	not	actual.	
Gert	resolves	this	tension	by	divorcing	HSL	properties	from	constant	
colours,	thereby	rejecting	(a).	But	there	is	another	route	that	accepts	
both	(a)	and	(b)	as	stated	and	keeps	colours	as	the	bearers	of	HSL	fea-
tures	—	it	is	the	solution	embodied	by	the	Layering	Thesis	as	applied	
to	colour	objectivism.	According	to	that	view	surfaces	have	constant	
colours,	and	the	relativities	in	constancy	scenarios	involve	variations	
in	 HSL	 features.	 However,	 the	 latter	 occur	 not	 because	 surface	 co-
lours	do	not	themselves	have	stable	HSL	properties	but	because	they 
are not the only things in one’s line of sight that do.	Assuming	that	filters	
and	illuminants	have	HSL	properties,	and	that	in	constancy	scenarios	
we	are	viewing	the	(complete	or	partial)	HSL	properties	of	some	sur-
face	 through	 the	(complete	or	partial)	HSL	properties	of	 some	(one	
or	more)	 illuminant/filter,	 the	perceived	variations	 resulting	 from	 il-
lumination/filter	changes	require	perceived	and	actual	variations	and 
constancies in	HSL	properties.	The	tension	between	(a)	and	(b)	is	re-
solved	by	recognizing	that	along	one	line	of	sight	we	are	perceiving	
at	least	two	sets	of	(complete	or	partial)	HSL	properties,	one	constant	
surface	colour	set,	and	one	or	more	variable	illuminant/filter	set.	We	
therefore	maneuver	 our	way	 through	 this	 tension	 to	 a	 natural	 solu-
tion	not	merely	by	accepting	the	idea	that	we	can	have	perspectives	
on	constant	colours	but	by	correctly	explicating	 it.	Neither	Gert	nor	
Hilbert	have	adequately	done	so.
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and	 subject	 peculiarities,	where	 conditions	 of	 viewing	 includes	 illu-
mination	and	(it	seems)	filters55,	among	other	factors.	The	account	is	
inspired	by	a	strict	reading	of	colour	experience,	to	code	into	colour	
ontology	all	the	subtle	variations	in	experience	that	arise	as	contextual	
factors	change.	Unfortunately,	putting	illumination	and	filters	into	the	
relata	of	relational	colours	and	experiences	of	them	is	at	least	on	first	
pass	at	odds	with	the	idea	that	the	beer	(or	sunglasses)	and	the	book	
have	distinct	colours,	and	that	we	can	experience	both	of	them	as	hav-
ing	distinct	colours	along	a	line	of	sight.	Cohen’s	colour	ontology	and	
the	conception	of	experience	that	is	its	inspiration	are	thus	in	seeming	
tension	with	not	merely	the	Layering	analysis	of	constancy	but	with	
otherwise	uncontroversial	cases	of	experiences	of	layered	colours	like	
the	beer-book	case.	It	may	be	that	sometimes	(e. g.,	Image	2,	Fusion)	
the	 illuminant/filter	 contributions	 are	 fused	 in	 experience	with	 the	
surface	contributions,	but	it	is	equally	compelling	that	at	other	times	
they	are	not.	It	is	difficult	to	appreciate	this	difference,	let	alone	accom-
modate	it,	from	within	Cohen’s	relationalist	colour	ontology	and	the	
conception	of	colour	experience	from	which	it	derives.56 
Given	 these	 points	 the	 significance	 of	Cohen’s	 counterfactualist	
account	of	 constancy	can	be	more	 fully	appreciated.	 It	was	 initially	
useful	 primarily	 as	 an	 account	 that	 undermines	 the	 inference	 from	
constancy	to	colour	objectivism.	While	it	can	still	do	this,	given	the	
above	it	is	not	needed	for	the	task	and	its	limitations	are	more	appar-
ent.	 Perhaps	more	 importantly,	 given	 the	 Layering	 account	 of	 con-
stancy	the	counterfactualist	account	remains	not	as	the	account	that	
allows	us	to	avoid	the	 inference	from	constancy	to	objectivism,	but	
instead	as	one	that	pushes	the	inference	from	constancy	to	relational-
ism.	I	take	this	latter	inference	to	be	worth	pursuing,	but	now	avoid-
able	by	colour	subjectivists	who	feel	it	prudent	to	search	for	a	Present	
account	of	colour	constancy.
55.	 See,	 e. g.,	 Cohen	 (2009,	 33),	 where	 he	 includes	 “lighting”	 and	 “tinted	 sun-
glasses”	in	“viewing	conditions”.	The	inclusion	of	filters	is	not	given	extended	
discussion	in	the	work.
56.	See	Brown	(forthcoming)	for	discussion.	
personal	 judgements	based	on	what	 is	present	 in	experience	—	then	
the	Layering	account	of	constancy	appears	strong	relative	to	its	rivals.	
At	minimum,	 to	 accommodate	 constancy	 objectivists	 should	 add	 il-
luminants	to	their	standard	list	of	coloured	things	(surfaces,	films,	vol-
umes,	light	sources).
I	 have	 throughout	 emphasized	 that	 the	 Layering	 account	 of	 con-
stancy	 is	not	being	offered	to	explain	all constancy	cases.	 It	explains	
a	 host	 of	 Filter	 cases	 and	 credibly	 explains	 many	 Illuminant	 ones.	
However,	my	primary	 aim	has	been	 to	 articulate	 this	option	 and	 its	
strengths,	 so	 that	moving	 forward	we	can	proceed	 through	different	
constancy	cases	or	 types	of	constancy	cases	 to	assess	whether	a	Lay-
ering	analysis	or	one	of	 its	rivals	should	be	employed.	An	important	
class	of	rivals	is	what	I	have	called	Absent	or	experientially	anti-realist	
accounts	 (e. g.,	Cohen	2008).	Stated	 loosely,	on	 these	views	constant	
colours	are	not	present	in	experience	but	are	(sub)personally	inferred	
from	what	is	present.	In	Cohen’s	case	variable	colours	are	occurrent	in	
experience	and	the	world	during	constancy	perceptions,	and	constant	
colours	are	not.	However,	to	explain	constancy	data	Cohen	postulates	
that	our	perceptual	states	express	a	counterfactual	content	that	asserts	
that	a	colour	like	(or	even	the	same	as)	one	of	the	occurrent	ones	would	
be	experienced	were	matters	otherwise.	Perhaps	some	constancy	data	
should	be	explained	this	way,	but	I	suspect	much	should	not.	As	with	
much	 experience,	 considerable	 vagueness	 will	 be	 confronted	 at	 at-
tempts	to	precisely	delimit	the	Present	and	Absent	cases.	This	should	
not	persuade	us	to	abandon	the	distinction	any	more	than	I	am	willing	
to	abandon	the	claim	that	today	my	grandfather	is	both	alive	and	bald.	
In	any	case,	the	issue	can	only	be	addressed	with	clear	alternatives	in	
place,	and	putting	forth	a	more	credible	experientially	realist	alterna-
tive	has	been	one	of	my	core	aims.	As	a	means	of	situating	Cohen’s	
counterfactualist	proposal	going	forward,	consider	the	following.
Although	I	didn’t	engage	in	a	thorough	discussion	of	Cohen’s	(2009)	
broader	view	 (but	 instead	only	discussed	his	 account	of	 constancy),	
layered	colours	create	a	challenge	 for	him.	Cohen	conceives	of	 indi-
vidual	 colours	 as	 relations	 between	 surfaces,	 conditions	 of	 viewing,	
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other	(full	or	partial)	colour.	It	is	a	state	in	which	two	distinct	ontological	
properties	are	given	simultaneously,	or	more	precisely	are	given	from	
the	same	line	of	sight.	This	makes	the	epistemic	task	of	accurately	dis-
entangling	these	elements	not	merely	one	that	must	be	faced	from	time	
to	time,	but	one	so	prominent	that	our	vision	system’s	solution	to	it	is	
plausibly	part	of	the	fabric	of	the	system	itself.	To	my	mind	this	is	the	
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been	plunged	into	a	world	of	colour	without	being	told	that	we	rarely	if	
ever	will	look	to	a	location	and	experience	just	one	of	them.57
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